Re: [Evolution] Evolution/GPG

[Stig Roar Wangberg <srw openmailbox org>]

må. den 22. 02. 2016 klokka 03.58 (+0100) skreiv Ralf Mardorf:
> On Sun, 21 Feb 2016 21:22:02 +0100, Stig Roar Wangberg wrote:
> > I only encrypt to people I trust IF the message requires it.
>
> Here we face another issue. If you don't always encrypt messages, then
> a judge could assume that the encrypted email are related to a crime.
> In some countries, IIRC e.g. Great Britain, people can be forced by law
> to decrypt data, if they don't do it, they get arrested. In Germany we
> have a strong data protection, AFAIK you can't be forced to decrypt
> data. Btw. by accident I lost some unimportant keys, so I can't decrypt
> some unimportant data, but this could become an issue in countries,
> that are allowed to force you, to decrypt data. However, some nations
> even use torture. "IF the message requires it" is a strange statement.
> Actually all mail, perhaps excepted of postcards, are liable to
> inviolability of the mail. If you like to turn the spotlight on you,
> then encrypt just a few messages, so police and others know at least
> dates, when you might be involved in crimes or whatsoever they are
> interested in. IOW by decrypting messages that "require" decryption and
> at the same time not encrypting other messages, you already provide
> useful data to those who are interested in it. The content of the
> message might be unimportant to them, the only information they need
> is, that at a given date you corresponded by encrypted emails. Now you
> could argue, that in addition you're using anonymous mailing, mixminion
> or similar. Since TOR was mentioned I'll quote from the FAQs:
>
> "So I'm totally anonymous if I use Tor?
> No.
> [snip]"
>
> "What attacks remain against onion routing?
> As mentioned above, it is possible for an observer who can view both
> you and either the destination website or your Tor exit node to
> correlate timings of your traffic as it enters the Tor network and also
> as it exits. Tor does not defend against such a threat model.
>
> [snip]
>
> Furthermore, since Tor reuses circuits for multiple TCP connections, it
> is possible to associate non anonymous and anonymous traffic at a given
> exit node, so be careful about what applications you run concurrently
> over Tor. Perhaps even run separate Tor clients for these applications."
> - https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en
>
> IOW e.g. even if you run Ardour, a digital audio workstation that phones
> home and it phones home, while you are using TOR browser, a lot of the
> security provided by TOR could be null and void.
>
> Regards,
> Ralf

But I DO agree with the facts you are presenting. 
Thank you, Ralf.

Best regards,
Stig