Re: Homenet




Op 22-3-2016 om 11:10 schreef Tim Coote:
There are further complications arising from ISP disconnection or prefix renumbering. Homenet rfcs discuss 
the use of ULAs (similar in concept to rfc 1918 addresses) to handle the startup situation of building a 
house before its connected to an ISP, but providing multiple /48 subnets that can be routed between so that 
the installed hosts can communicate.  I’d not expected prefixes to change often, but discussion with ISPs 
that are rolling out IPv6 show that this will be standard practice. Homenet covers this too, including 
automated dns updates.

An open issue to me is how the OS apis would need to be changed to work with varying source routeing (each 
host will have several IPv6 addresses, with varying latency, bandwidth and monetary costs. I think that the 
use of per host certficates will also need some work to avoid spoofing in the face of multiple IP addresses, 
while not making it too hard for a consumer to replace a host (e.g. a room thermometer, or the mote 
monitoring a tyre on her car).

The current state of homenet has no security model, and the general experience of the development of security 
models in the computer industry has not been good.

The overlying impression is that they've come up with designs that suprised them (themselves) two miles later down the road when many of these issues should have been a concern in the first place.

If you get surprised by your own creations, you're not doing it fully conscious you know.

It seems like essentials are just left as a worry or exercise for those who care after the main architecture has already been completed. "Oh, we'll solve that later".

Here is a guy with experience with ULAs: https://github.com/sbyx/ohybridproxy/issues/4

The person who responds says it's just a bug and it will get fixed. But then the guy says: I do not want any dependence on my ISP whatsoever for my homenet routing.

Meaning, he wants his router to generate an ULA and use that for all hostname resolution within the network. That also seems to imply that any addressing from the outside (the mobile device moving across borders) is not going to work when it uses a hostname.

If the designers had no oversight of what they were doing and creating when they were creating it, it means nothing is well defined and a consistent security model will also not be possible. Of course Homenet is just a best practice way to deal with IPv6 in the home right.

It's not the fault of Homenet, it is the fault of IPv6.

Homenet tries to solve these issues. If you start out with a certain concept and you can't change it and you have to build on that, you're just going to do the best you can and from the looks of it Homenet is not even doing such a bad job either.

It's just that local independence from an ISP prefix should be MANDATORY. Your prefix should give access to your HOME but not to the devices within it.

This is the flawed method of addressing I was discussing:

- the external address of your network, and
- the internal address of your sub-network

should be different and independent numbers.

But both are expected to sit in the same 128 bit field, which is clearly impossible unless you forget about the 64-bit prefix and use your own 64 bits to create your own subnet prefixes as required.

That would imply that addressing in the home should not even USE the first 64 bit of the address field. That in turn would imply that the network should only have one (external) prefix, or that addressing from the outside using that prefix should be uniquely resolvable at all times, which means that if different prefixes ARE used, the internal host part should still be unique.

All complications.

Bart.



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