Re: Beyond MAC randomization (prevent tracking)

[Chris Laprise <tasket openmailbox org>]

On 04/10/2017 01:35 PM, Chris Laprise wrote:

> 1. A Study of MAC Address Randomization in Mobile Devices and
> When it Fails
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.02874v1.pdf



A listing of best practices from the paper:

> Randomize across the entire address, providing
> 2^46 bits of randomization.
>
> Use a random address for every probe request
> frame.
>
> Remove sequence numbers from probe requests.
>
> If sequence numbers are used, reset sequence
> number when transmitting authentication and
> association frames.
>
> Never send probe requests using a global MAC
> address.
>
> Enforce a policy requiring a minimal and stan-
> dard set of vendor IEs. Move any lost function-
> ality to the authentication/association process,
> or upon network establishment utilize discovery
> protocols.
>
> Specifically, the use of WPS attributes should
> be removed except when performing P2P opera-
> tions. Prohibit unique vendor tags such as those
> introduced by Apple iOS 10.
>
> Eliminate the use of directed probe requests for
> cellular offloading.
>
> Mandate that chipset firmware remove behavior
> where RTS frames received while in State 1 elicit
> a CTS response.


Seems like NM and careful configuration might address some of these 
points...


(BTW, the usna.edu address appears to be disabled.)

--

Chris Laprise, tasket openmailbox org
https://twitter.com/ttaskett
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