Re: About SSL "Trick or Treat" Dialogs
- From: Stef Walter <stef-list memberwebs com>
- To: Owen Taylor <otaylor redhat com>
- Cc: "desktop-devel-list gnome org" <desktop-devel-list gnome org>
- Subject: Re: About SSL "Trick or Treat" Dialogs
- Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2007 11:48:47 +0000 (UTC)
Owen Taylor wrote:
>>> (And note that Stef's proposal doesn't just greenlight a connection to
>>> https://bugs.freedesktop.org, it greenlights a https connection to a
>>> DNS-spoofed https://mybank.com.)
>> Neither bugs.freedesktop.org or a DNS spoofed https site would be
>> 'greenlighted' under my proposal. Just the opposite. It would be treated
>> just like the untrusted connection that it is.
>
> If I have a bookmark (or link) to https://mybank.com and I go there, and
> I see my banking site, and even the correct https URL in my browser
> line, and the only indication that something went wrong is that the
> I don't get a lock icon, that's not greenlighting?
>
> You can't expect people to be warned by the *absence* of something.
True. It makes sense in the bookmark case.
In other cases, if the scammer used or redirected to a normal http
non-SSL connection, then then the only warning would be the absence of
the lock icon and the 's' in the URL.
> (Sure, ssh-style checking against history would help, in certain
> cases, but you are still losing much of the strength of https.)
I'm not sure I understand. Let's say some history checking of certifates
-> domains was implemented, how that would cause a loss of strength in
https? Obviously you've thought about these issues thoroughly, so I'm
interested.
>> A TCP connection is basically untrusted. And an SSL connection to
>> someone we can't verify is the same from a trust perspective.
>>
>> Of course, if someone (like Pat with his mail server) has noted a
>> specific certificate to be trust worthy, then it will be treated as
>> trusted whether or not we have a root CA for it.
>>
>> But presenting the user with the choice every time is wrong in my opinion.
>
> Yes, asking the user is wrong... TLS was designed to have central
> signing authorities. To make it work as designed, you have to *DENY* the
> self-signed case and force server admins to do one of:
>
> A) Buy a cert from an existing CA
> B) Work with others to create an alternate CA system
> C) Tell their users how to install a certificate
Yes, the Internet would certainly be a better place had everything been
both thought out and implemented properly... But now we're stuck with
finding solutions to these real world problems :(
Cheers,
Stef
[
Date Prev][
Date Next] [
Thread Prev][
Thread Next]
[
Thread Index]
[
Date Index]
[
Author Index]