Re: "orbit-<username>" dir in /tmp
- From: Michael Meeks <michael ximian com>
- To: Jacob Berkman <jacob ximian com>
- Cc: Hema Seetharamaiah <hema seetharamaiah wipro com>,orbit <orbit-list gnome org>, Havoc Pennington <hp redhat com>,Mark McLoughlin <mark skynet ie>, Elliot Lee <sopwith redhat com>
- Subject: Re: "orbit-<username>" dir in /tmp
- Date: 07 Jun 2002 11:44:12 +0100
Hi Jacob / Hema,
[ Havoc, the problem is of people maliciously creating
/tmp/orbit-$USER directories to disrupt local Unix Domain
socket communications ].
On Mon, 2002-06-03 at 18:56, jacob berkman wrote:
> On Fri, 2002-05-31 at 09:20, Hema Seetharamaiah wrote:
> > On Linux, this directory will stay across reboots until perhaps the user
> > explicitly deletes it.
>
> (this is not actually the case - some linux distributions clean /tmp on
> reboot so you can potentially see this problem on linux also)
So - the problem exists; and I can see 2 possible solutions.
a) use the users' homedir for the '.orbit-$(hostname)' directory
that would contain all the bonobo-activation lock files, and
linc socket nodes.
The problem with this approach is that I've heard complaints about
GConf's problems with NFS and locking [ in the user directory ].
Secondly there is a definate, limit on the length of the sun_path that
uniquely identifies a UDS - posix defines 100 characters. Consequently a
complex path to /mnt/foo/home/user/.orbit-$(hostname)/linc-123123123123
uses ~ half of that, and possibly worse - perhaps not a very problematic
consideration.
b) instead of having a defined /tmp/orbit-$(USER) we could scan
/tmp for orbit-$(USER)-%d where %d increments until we hit a
directory with the correct permissions [ or we could use the
opendir ordering if that is repeatably defined ].
This would keep a similar approach to the moment, keep the socket
paths short, but would involve a oneoff cost per app startup, to scan
the /tmp directory [ although this could in future be obviated with a
new API and bonobo-activation-server support ].
So - clearly the current 'one path or bust' scheme is not workable, and
very prone to denial of service issues;
I solicit advice on how best to solve the problem in anyone's opinion.
Regards,
Michael.
--
mmeeks@gnu.org <><, Pseudo Engineer, itinerant idiot
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