Re: How to activate MAC address randomization?

On 05/18/2016 08:24 AM, poma wrote:
On 18.05.2016 06:14, Chris Laprise wrote:

On 05/17/2016 07:36 PM, poma wrote:
On 16.05.2016 23:07, Chris Laprise wrote:
On 05/16/2016 12:03 PM, poma wrote:
On 13.05.2016 00:16, Dan Williams wrote:
On Fri, 2016-04-29 at 16:09 -0400, Chris Laprise wrote:

I just installed NetworkManager 1.2 in fedora 23 in the hopes that I
get mac randomization working. Only problem is there's no sign of a
setting for this in nmcli or the applet. I found a reference to a
setting on the NetworkManager.conf manpage which states:

               If left unspecified, MAC address randomization is
wpa_supplicant only gained the necessary functionality that
NetworkManager looks for back in late October 2015.  It was committed
after wpa_supplicant 2.5 but it appears there hasn't been a release
since then.  But once that happens, or if you build supplicant version
from git, NM will begin to use that capability if you've enable it in
the NM configuration.


dbus: Expose interface globals via D-Bus properties - 2.5 backport

Professor, your patch your move ;)
LOL, that's great. I hope this means the feature could land in Fedora
24, which has wpas 2.5.


# grep rand /etc/NetworkManager/NetworkManager.conf

# nmcli connection show WiFiRd | grep rand

# journalctl -o cat -b -u NetworkManager | grep random
NetworkManager[2081]: <info>  [...] sup-iface[[...],wlp0s2f1u3]: config: set MAC randomization to 1

The problem is that "rand-mac" does not work,
tested with patched 2.5 and 2.6-devel,
mt7601u and rt2800usb driven devices.

Does this leave us with fully functional pre-connection randomization
anyway? I would define 'full function' as the original mac addr not
being broadcast when Network Manager scans then connects using either of
the following:

1. A random address for any target AP
2. A static spoofed address for a predefined NM connection

The second case, at least, puts control of disclosure of the original
'hardware' address in the hands of the user. That is a big step in the
right direction.

I would also like to know if the second case is already possible with
the current unpatched releases of nm and wpas.

Many thanks,

2nd - 'cloned-mac-address' is there, if not from the very beginning
My concern here is just that some implementation detail will cause the original address to be announced anyway. For instance, mac addresses have a habit of reverting to original when waking a system from sleep. Conceivably, a scan could take place with original address before connection is re-established using assigned address.

So, a static spoofing function written for past use cases (which didn't grapple with concealment) may be different than a spoofing function that works to conceal original addresses.

1st - 'mac-address-randomization' i.e. "dynamic" version of the 2nd,
        works like this - observing 'watch -n.1 macchanger -s wlp0s2f1u3'
        it randomizes "Current MAC" value,
        Current MAC:   ea:1q:3w:z5:y8:ae  <=
        Permanent MAC: 00:11:22:33:44:55

        but during connection attempts it returns
        to the original - "Permanent MAC" value,
        Current MAC:   00:11:22:33:44:55  <=
        Permanent MAC: 00:11:22:33:44:55

But not quite simply a dynamic version of NM cloning, as NM didn't use macchanger. How hard would it be to move random number code into NM? Then it could have the same reliability as spoofing with a static address.


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