Re: gnome-keyring trust assertions
- From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf gmx com>
- To: Stef Walter <stefw collabora co uk>
- Cc: gnome-keyring-list gnome org
- Subject: Re: gnome-keyring trust assertions
- Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2010 09:17:49 +0200
Hi Stef,
On 12/14/2010 05:14 PM, Stef Walter wrote:
On 2010-12-14 01:01, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
On 12/13/2010 07:07 PM, Stef Walter wrote:
[...]
PKIX cert validation is complex, and I am not an expert. But I'm afraid
we have to fully specify the cert chain algorithm as you did. So we have
to cover all corner cases, including expiration etc.
I don't understand why we would need to specify things like expiration.
Aren't they covered by 'Step 5' in the 'Building a Certificate Chain'
section? Could you explain further?
I suppose they are covered indeed.
Regarding Anchored Assertions, I suggest to clarify: "These assertions
are only evaluated when associated with the root of the constructed
certificate chain. They are ignored if associated with any intermediate
certificate in the chain."
I don't think that's the case. An intermediate certificate may be
anchored. See step 3 in 'Building a Certificate Chain'. RFC 5280 allows
for this, as do most PKI implementations.
So the question is, can you have multiple CA certs in a chain have
anchored assertions associated with them. And then:
- Do you only use the "top" assertion?
- Only the "bottom" (most specific) assertion?
- An additive combination of all assertions along the path?
I'm afraid we should be aligned with
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6 (probably ignoring much of
their "policy" stuff).
Good plan. I'll study this further to see what it says when multiple
paths are available.
Cheers,
Stef
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