Re: [gmime-devel] avoiding metadata leaks when handling S/MIME-signed mail in GMime and other tools that use GnuPG



On Sat 2018-05-19 14:42:54 -0400, Jeffrey Stedfast wrote:
I kinda dropped the ball on this a while back but due to the recent 
Efail news, I resurrected my patch and have now committed it:

https://github.com/jstedfast/gmime/commit/57d16f7ca9ff76e2c46c518db43b6822a2ea075a

There is now a GMIME_VERIFY_DISABLE_ONLINE_CERTIFICATE_CHECKS flag that 
sets gpgsm into offline mode.

Question: Should this behavior be the default? I.e. should I invert the 
logic for DISABLE_ONLINE_CERTIFICATE_CHECKS into 
*ENABLE*_ONLINE_CERTIFICATE_CHECKS?

I'm wondering if perhaps that might be more prudent.

Unfortunately, I think that means it opens the client up to other 
potential risks such as letting revoked certificates go undiscovered.

I lean toward the default being no metadata leakage.

I agree that there is a risk about revoked certificates going
undetected, but that's something that the certificate scheme needs to
deal with separately, i think, and it's not appropriate to deal with it
at message investigation time.

thanks for working on this, Jeff.

   --dkg

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