camel patch comments:
-gpg_verify (CamelCipherContext *context, CamelMimePart *ipart,
CamelException *ex)
+gpg_doverify (CamelCipherContext *context, CamelStream *istream, CamelMimePart *sigpart, CamelException *ex)
maybe just "verify"? I'm not a big fan of doverify
+ // XXX: Hash only seems to be used for signing...
+ //gpg_ctx_set_hash (gpg, camel_cipher_id_to_hash(context, camel_content_type_param(ct, "micalg")));
don't use c++ style commenting... bad. anyway, the above code doesn't
hurt (it doesn't do anything with the data, but maybe someday it could)
doesn't really matter, could probably just be removed.
+ if (sigfile) {
+ gpg_ctx_set_sigfile (gpg, sigfile);
+ }
if it's just 1 statement under the if (and no comment), don't bother
with the {}'s
+ }
+
+ } else if (camel_content_type_is(ct, "application", "x-inline-pgp")) {
I'd prefer the extra blank line not be there. same with a few other
places in the code (and after the return statement you did the same
thing)
the code looks fine tho... the only thing I'd question is the faking of
a MIME part to do the verification of non-MIME pgp stuff. I'm undecided
about that :\
plugin comments:
you do a lot of unnecessary casting. for example:
+ inptr = (char *)data->data;
+ inend = inptr+(int)data->len;
neither of those is needed.
nor is this:
+ g_byte_array_append(out,(guint8*)"-", 1);
Jeff
On Sun, 2005-04-03 at 03:20 +1200, Matt Brown wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I've been working on some patches for this bounty (Bug #127521) for the
> past couple of weeks.
>
> Given the high level of interest I've received in these patches and the
> number of people emailing me, I am pleased to report that I have some
> preliminary patches that I think are working well enough to make them
> available for testing.
>
> 1) Modify the gpg_verify routine in camel-gpg-context.c to support
> verifying application/inline-pgp mime parts. Clearsigned verifications
> are different to PGP/Mime verifications so we can't just make a fake
> multipart/signed unfortunately.
> http://www.mattb.net.nz/evolution/eds-camel-inline-pgp.patch
>
> 2) This patch is the actual plugin that hooks the formatting handlers to
> detect and process inline pgp messages.
> http://www.mattb.net.nz/evolution/evo-plugin-inline-pgp.patch
>
> I have to stress that both these patches are BETA and have passed only
> the most preliminary testing so far, and there are a few known issues.
>
> Known Issues
> 1) The first 10 characters of the decrypted text are truncated when
> processing an encrypted block. I'm really stumped on this one!
> 2) Encrypted binary data (JPGs etc) will probably be displayed as
> text/plain atm
>
> Many thanks to Tommi Komulainen who contributed the code for
> constructing a multipart/encrypted mime part.
>
>
> Please test these patches and report back what works / what doesn't also
> if you have weird and wacky examples of inline pgp messages (whether
> valid or invalid) please email them to me at pgptest mattb net nz,
> please include in the subject a short description of what the message is
> (ie. "encrypted jpeg" or "invalid inline signature")
>
> Looking forward to your feedback :)
>
> Regards
>
--
Jeffrey Stedfast
Evolution Hacker - Novell, Inc.
fejj ximian com - www.novell.com
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