Re: feature request/feature discussion?
- From: "Luis Villa" <luis villa gmail com>
- To: "Matthew Paul Thomas" <mpt myrealbox com>
- Cc: epiphany list <epiphany-list gnome org>
- Subject: Re: feature request/feature discussion?
- Date: Fri, 19 May 2006 02:57:59 -0400
On 5/19/06, Matthew Paul Thomas <mpt myrealbox com> wrote:
On May 17, 2006, at 2:36 PM, Luis Villa wrote:
> ...
> Related to my email of last night, I'm wondering if there is a way
> (more likely, would it be possible to add a way) to launch epiphany
> without chrome (or with minimal, app-appropriate chrome) for more
> app-like behavior?
> ...
> Is it possible? If not, should I file a bug, or is it something that
> people wouldn't want to add?
> ...
The big issue would be security -- how do you tell whether this is the
real application, or a phishing version, or a domain name hijack? At
the moment, the only built-in defence browsers have against the latter
two is (a) always displaying the domain name and (b) always displaying
encryption status (as the padlock icon). This is why even those
browsers that used to allow chromeless windows no longer do.
<http://www.techweb.com/wire/security/174401623>
Which, frankly, is dumb. The only thing that this prevents is a webapp
that looks like a fake real application (the 'our security scan shows
you have a virus!' problem), which....
You could argue that by "installing" the Web app into your Applications
menu or equivalent, you're taking the same responsibility for
vouchsafing its security as when you install a local application.
...exactly.
But
unlike local apps, a cracker can take over a Web app without you doing
anything at all (the parallel to this is having to manually confirm
installation of OS updates even when, as in Windows XP, they have
downloaded in the background). And subverting your OS distributor's
software repository is, one would hope, more difficult than cracking
any individual Web application.
Showing the URL does exactly jackshit to safeguard you against this
problem. If someone compromises mail.google.com, or compromises my
DNS, what does the URL going to tell me? It will still be
mail.google.com, and I'm still hosed. In the phishing case, where the
URL is similar-but-not-quite, people are reliably incapable of telling
the difference between a real URL and a bogus one anywyay. That
checking has to happen much more reliably and visibly than in the URL
bar- showing the URL bar is a very, very false sense of security.
Luis
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