[glib-networking/mcatanzaro/pkcs11-restoration] Revert "Revert PKCS#11 support"
- From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro src gnome org>
- To: commits-list gnome org
- Cc:
- Subject: [glib-networking/mcatanzaro/pkcs11-restoration] Revert "Revert PKCS#11 support"
- Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 14:57:17 +0000 (UTC)
commit 48b953d05ede656e1538c2021cc69e0cc57eaabf
Author: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro gnome org>
Date: Fri Jan 31 08:56:24 2020 -0600
Revert "Revert PKCS#11 support"
This reverts commit d90b93a84b725c5da4886a204a59d456b4a1222c, restoring
all the PKCS#11 code.
tls/gnutls/gtlscertificate-gnutls.c | 130 +-
tls/gnutls/gtlscertificate-gnutls.h | 1 +
tls/gnutls/gtlsconnection-gnutls.c | 82 +-
tls/gnutls/gtlsserverconnection-gnutls.c | 4 +-
tls/tests/certificate.c | 39 +
tls/tests/connection.c | 142 ++
tls/tests/meson.build | 26 +-
tls/tests/mock-pkcs11.c | 3051 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11.h | 252 +++
tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11f.h | 812 ++++++++
tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11p.h | 24 +
tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11t.h | 1799 ++++++++++++++++++
tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11u.h | 22 +
13 files changed, 6335 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/tls/gnutls/gtlscertificate-gnutls.c b/tls/gnutls/gtlscertificate-gnutls.c
index c6a79fd..9d81cce 100644
--- a/tls/gnutls/gtlscertificate-gnutls.c
+++ b/tls/gnutls/gtlscertificate-gnutls.c
@@ -39,7 +39,9 @@ enum
PROP_CERTIFICATE_PEM,
PROP_PRIVATE_KEY,
PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM,
- PROP_ISSUER
+ PROP_ISSUER,
+ PROP_PKCS11_URI,
+ PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS11_URI,
};
struct _GTlsCertificateGnutls
@@ -47,7 +49,10 @@ struct _GTlsCertificateGnutls
GTlsCertificate parent_instance;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
- gnutls_x509_privkey_t key;
+ gnutls_privkey_t key;
+
+ gchar *pkcs11_uri;
+ gchar *private_key_pkcs11_uri;
GTlsCertificateGnutls *issuer;
@@ -69,7 +74,10 @@ g_tls_certificate_gnutls_finalize (GObject *object)
GTlsCertificateGnutls *gnutls = G_TLS_CERTIFICATE_GNUTLS (object);
g_clear_pointer (&gnutls->cert, gnutls_x509_crt_deinit);
- g_clear_pointer (&gnutls->key, gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit);
+ g_clear_pointer (&gnutls->key, gnutls_privkey_deinit);
+
+ g_clear_pointer (&gnutls->pkcs11_uri, g_free);
+ g_clear_pointer (&gnutls->private_key_pkcs11_uri, g_free);
g_clear_object (&gnutls->issuer);
@@ -141,6 +149,14 @@ g_tls_certificate_gnutls_get_property (GObject *object,
g_value_set_object (value, gnutls->issuer);
break;
+ case PROP_PKCS11_URI:
+ g_value_set_string (value, gnutls->pkcs11_uri);
+ break;
+
+ case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS11_URI:
+ g_value_set_string (value, gnutls->private_key_pkcs11_uri);
+ break;
+
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
}
@@ -209,18 +225,10 @@ g_tls_certificate_gnutls_set_property (GObject *object,
data.data = bytes->data;
data.size = bytes->len;
if (!gnutls->key)
- gnutls_x509_privkey_init (&gnutls->key);
- status = gnutls_x509_privkey_import (gnutls->key, &data,
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
- if (status != 0)
- {
- int pkcs8_status =
- gnutls_x509_privkey_import_pkcs8 (gnutls->key, &data,
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, NULL,
- GNUTLS_PKCS_PLAIN);
- if (pkcs8_status == 0)
- status = 0;
- }
+ gnutls_privkey_init (&gnutls->key);
+ status = gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw (gnutls->key, &data,
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER,
+ NULL, GNUTLS_PKCS_PLAIN);
if (status == 0)
gnutls->have_key = TRUE;
else if (!gnutls->construct_error)
@@ -240,18 +248,10 @@ g_tls_certificate_gnutls_set_property (GObject *object,
data.data = (void *)string;
data.size = strlen (string);
if (!gnutls->key)
- gnutls_x509_privkey_init (&gnutls->key);
- status = gnutls_x509_privkey_import (gnutls->key, &data,
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
- if (status != 0)
- {
- int pkcs8_status =
- gnutls_x509_privkey_import_pkcs8 (gnutls->key, &data,
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, NULL,
- GNUTLS_PKCS_PLAIN);
- if (pkcs8_status == 0)
- status = 0;
- }
+ gnutls_privkey_init (&gnutls->key);
+ status = gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw (gnutls->key, &data,
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,
+ NULL, GNUTLS_PKCS_PLAIN);
if (status == 0)
gnutls->have_key = TRUE;
else if (!gnutls->construct_error)
@@ -267,6 +267,39 @@ g_tls_certificate_gnutls_set_property (GObject *object,
gnutls->issuer = g_value_dup_object (value);
break;
+ case PROP_PKCS11_URI:
+ string = g_value_get_string (value);
+ if (!string)
+ break;
+ g_return_if_fail (gnutls->have_cert == FALSE);
+ g_return_if_fail (!gnutls->pkcs11_uri);
+
+ gnutls->pkcs11_uri = g_strdup (string);
+
+ status = gnutls_x509_crt_import_url (gnutls->cert, string, GNUTLS_PKCS11_OBJ_FLAG_CRT);
+ if (status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ gnutls->have_cert = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (!gnutls->construct_error)
+ {
+ gnutls->construct_error =
+ g_error_new (G_TLS_ERROR, G_TLS_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
+ _("Could not import PKCS #11 certificate URI: %s"),
+ gnutls_strerror (status));
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS11_URI:
+ string = g_value_get_string (value);
+ if (!string)
+ break;
+ g_return_if_fail (gnutls->have_key == FALSE);
+ g_return_if_fail (!gnutls->private_key_pkcs11_uri);
+
+ gnutls->private_key_pkcs11_uri = g_strdup (string);
+ break;
+
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
}
@@ -376,6 +409,8 @@ g_tls_certificate_gnutls_class_init (GTlsCertificateGnutlsClass *klass)
g_object_class_override_property (gobject_class, PROP_PRIVATE_KEY, "private-key");
g_object_class_override_property (gobject_class, PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM, "private-key-pem");
g_object_class_override_property (gobject_class, PROP_ISSUER, "issuer");
+ g_object_class_override_property (gobject_class, PROP_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11-uri");
+ g_object_class_override_property (gobject_class, PROP_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS11_URI, "private-key-pkcs11-uri");
}
static void
@@ -416,6 +451,12 @@ g_tls_certificate_gnutls_get_cert (GTlsCertificateGnutls *gnutls)
return gnutls->cert;
}
+gboolean
+g_tls_certificate_gnutls_is_pkcs11_backed (GTlsCertificateGnutls *gnutls)
+{
+ return gnutls->pkcs11_uri != NULL;
+}
+
gboolean
g_tls_certificate_gnutls_has_key (GTlsCertificateGnutls *gnutls)
{
@@ -472,23 +513,28 @@ g_tls_certificate_gnutls_copy (GTlsCertificateGnutls *gnutls,
chain = chain->issuer;
}
- if (gnutls->key)
- {
- gnutls_x509_privkey_t x509_privkey;
- gnutls_privkey_t privkey;
+ if (gnutls->key)
+ {
+ gnutls_x509_privkey_t x509_privkey;
- gnutls_x509_privkey_init (&x509_privkey);
- gnutls_x509_privkey_cpy (x509_privkey, gnutls->key);
+ gnutls_privkey_export_x509 (gnutls->key, &x509_privkey);
+ gnutls_privkey_import_x509 (*pkey, x509_privkey, GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_IMPORT_COPY);
+ gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit (x509_privkey);
+ }
+ else if (gnutls->private_key_pkcs11_uri || gnutls->pkcs11_uri)
+ {
+ int status;
- gnutls_privkey_init (&privkey);
- gnutls_privkey_import_x509 (privkey, x509_privkey, GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_IMPORT_COPY);
- *pkey = privkey;
- gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit (x509_privkey);
- }
- else
- {
- *pkey = NULL;
- }
+ status = gnutls_privkey_import_pkcs11_url (*pkey,
+ gnutls->private_key_pkcs11_uri ?
gnutls->private_key_pkcs11_uri : gnutls->pkcs11_uri);
+ if (status != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ g_warning ("Failed to copy PKCS #11 private key: %s", gnutls_strerror (status));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ gnutls_privkey_deinit (*pkey);
+ *pkey = NULL;
+ }
}
void
diff --git a/tls/gnutls/gtlscertificate-gnutls.h b/tls/gnutls/gtlscertificate-gnutls.h
index 74ad7f7..838f7db 100644
--- a/tls/gnutls/gtlscertificate-gnutls.h
+++ b/tls/gnutls/gtlscertificate-gnutls.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ void g_tls_certificate_gnutls_set_data (GTlsCerti
const gnutls_x509_crt_t g_tls_certificate_gnutls_get_cert (GTlsCertificateGnutls *gnutls);
gboolean g_tls_certificate_gnutls_has_key (GTlsCertificateGnutls *gnutls);
+gboolean g_tls_certificate_gnutls_is_pkcs11_backed (GTlsCertificateGnutls *gnutls);
void g_tls_certificate_gnutls_copy (GTlsCertificateGnutls *gnutls,
const gchar
*interaction_id,
diff --git a/tls/gnutls/gtlsconnection-gnutls.c b/tls/gnutls/gtlsconnection-gnutls.c
index e8e399c..39cc7c5 100644
--- a/tls/gnutls/gtlsconnection-gnutls.c
+++ b/tls/gnutls/gtlsconnection-gnutls.c
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ typedef struct
gnutls_certificate_credentials_t creds;
gnutls_session_t session;
gchar *interaction_id;
+ GCancellable *cancellable;
} GTlsConnectionGnutlsPrivate;
G_DEFINE_ABSTRACT_TYPE_WITH_CODE (GTlsConnectionGnutls, g_tls_connection_gnutls, G_TYPE_TLS_CONNECTION_BASE,
@@ -92,6 +93,8 @@ g_tls_connection_gnutls_init (GTlsConnectionGnutls *gnutls)
unique_id = g_atomic_int_add (&unique_interaction_id, 1);
priv->interaction_id = g_strdup_printf ("gtls:%d", unique_id);
+
+ priv->cancellable = g_cancellable_new ();
}
static void
@@ -197,6 +200,12 @@ g_tls_connection_gnutls_finalize (GObject *object)
if (priv->creds)
gnutls_certificate_free_credentials (priv->creds);
+ if (priv->cancellable)
+ {
+ g_cancellable_cancel (priv->cancellable);
+ g_clear_object (&priv->cancellable);
+ }
+
g_free (priv->interaction_id);
G_OBJECT_CLASS (g_tls_connection_gnutls_parent_class)->finalize (object);
@@ -218,6 +227,71 @@ g_tls_connection_gnutls_get_session (GTlsConnectionGnutls *gnutls)
return priv->session;
}
+static int
+on_pin_request (void *userdata,
+ int attempt,
+ const char *token_url,
+ const char *token_label,
+ unsigned int callback_flags,
+ char *pin,
+ size_t pin_max)
+{
+ GTlsConnection *connection = G_TLS_CONNECTION (userdata);
+ GTlsConnectionGnutlsPrivate *priv = g_tls_connection_gnutls_get_instance_private (G_TLS_CONNECTION_GNUTLS
(connection));
+ GTlsInteraction *interaction = g_tls_connection_get_interaction (connection);
+ GTlsInteractionResult result;
+ GTlsPassword *password;
+ GTlsPasswordFlags password_flags = 0;
+ GError *error = NULL;
+ gchar *description;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (!interaction)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (callback_flags & GNUTLS_PIN_WRONG)
+ password_flags |= G_TLS_PASSWORD_RETRY;
+ if (callback_flags & GNUTLS_PIN_COUNT_LOW)
+ password_flags |= G_TLS_PASSWORD_MANY_TRIES;
+ if (callback_flags & GNUTLS_PIN_FINAL_TRY || attempt > 5) /* Give up at some point */
+ password_flags |= G_TLS_PASSWORD_FINAL_TRY;
+
+ description = g_strdup_printf (" %s (%s)", token_label, token_url);
+ password = g_tls_password_new (password_flags, description);
+ result = g_tls_interaction_invoke_ask_password (interaction, password,
+ priv->cancellable,
+ &error);
+ g_free (description);
+
+ switch (result)
+ {
+ case G_TLS_INTERACTION_FAILED:
+ if (!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_CANCELLED))
+ g_warning ("Error getting PIN: %s", error->message);
+ g_error_free (error);
+ break;
+ case G_TLS_INTERACTION_UNHANDLED:
+ break;
+ case G_TLS_INTERACTION_HANDLED:
+ {
+ gsize password_size;
+ const guchar *password_data = g_tls_password_get_value (password, &password_size);
+ if (password_size > pin_max)
+ g_warning ("PIN is larger than max PIN size");
+
+ memcpy (pin, password_data, MIN (password_size, pin_max));
+ ret = GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ g_assert_not_reached ();
+ }
+
+ g_object_unref (password);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
void
g_tls_connection_gnutls_handshake_thread_get_certificate (GTlsConnectionGnutls *gnutls,
gnutls_pcert_st **pcert,
@@ -231,9 +305,15 @@ g_tls_connection_gnutls_handshake_thread_get_certificate (GTlsConnectionGnutls
if (cert)
{
+ /* Send along a pre-initialized privkey so we can handle the callback here. */
+ gnutls_privkey_t privkey;
+ gnutls_privkey_init (&privkey);
+ gnutls_privkey_set_pin_function (privkey, on_pin_request, gnutls);
+
g_tls_certificate_gnutls_copy (G_TLS_CERTIFICATE_GNUTLS (cert),
priv->interaction_id,
- pcert, pcert_length, pkey);
+ pcert, pcert_length, &privkey);
+ *pkey = privkey;
}
else
{
diff --git a/tls/gnutls/gtlsserverconnection-gnutls.c b/tls/gnutls/gtlsserverconnection-gnutls.c
index 18a97da..090b57d 100644
--- a/tls/gnutls/gtlsserverconnection-gnutls.c
+++ b/tls/gnutls/gtlsserverconnection-gnutls.c
@@ -115,8 +115,10 @@ g_tls_server_connection_gnutls_initable_init (GInitable *initable,
creds = g_tls_connection_gnutls_get_credentials (G_TLS_CONNECTION_GNUTLS (gnutls));
gnutls_certificate_set_retrieve_function2 (creds,
g_tls_server_connection_gnutls_handshake_thread_retrieve_function);
+ /* Currently we don't know ahead of time if a PKCS #11 backed certificate has a private key. */
cert = g_tls_connection_get_certificate (G_TLS_CONNECTION (initable));
- if (cert && !g_tls_certificate_gnutls_has_key (G_TLS_CERTIFICATE_GNUTLS (cert)))
+ if (cert && !g_tls_certificate_gnutls_has_key (G_TLS_CERTIFICATE_GNUTLS (cert)) &&
+ !g_tls_certificate_gnutls_is_pkcs11_backed (G_TLS_CERTIFICATE_GNUTLS (cert)))
{
g_set_error_literal (error, G_TLS_ERROR, G_TLS_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
_("Certificate has no private key"));
diff --git a/tls/tests/certificate.c b/tls/tests/certificate.c
index 81e2ebb..8e69ac1 100644
--- a/tls/tests/certificate.c
+++ b/tls/tests/certificate.c
@@ -26,6 +26,11 @@
#include <gio/gio.h>
+#ifdef BACKEND_IS_GNUTLS
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/pkcs11.h>
+#endif
+
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -243,6 +248,25 @@ test_create_certificate_with_garbage_input (TestCertificate *test,
g_clear_error (&error);
}
+static void
+test_create_certificate_pkcs11 (TestCertificate *test,
+ gconstpointer data)
+{
+#ifndef BACKEND_IS_GNUTLS
+ g_test_skip ("This backend does not support PKCS #11");
+#else
+ GTlsCertificate *cert;
+ GError *error = NULL;
+
+ cert = g_initable_new (test->cert_gtype, NULL, &error,
+ "pkcs11-uri",
"pkcs11:model=mock;token=Mock%20Certificate;object=Mock%20Certificate",
+ NULL);
+
+ g_assert_no_error (error);
+ g_assert_nonnull (cert);
+#endif
+}
+
static void
test_create_certificate_chain (void)
{
@@ -556,12 +580,25 @@ int
main (int argc,
char *argv[])
{
+#ifdef BACKEND_IS_GNUTLS
+ char *module_path;
+#endif
+
g_test_init (&argc, &argv, NULL);
g_setenv ("GSETTINGS_BACKEND", "memory", TRUE);
g_setenv ("GIO_USE_TLS", BACKEND, TRUE);
g_assert (g_ascii_strcasecmp (G_OBJECT_TYPE_NAME (g_tls_backend_get_default ()), "GTlsBackend" BACKEND) ==
0);
+#ifdef BACKEND_IS_GNUTLS
+ module_path = g_test_build_filename (G_TEST_BUILT, "mock-pkcs11.so", NULL);
+ g_assert_true (g_file_test (module_path, G_FILE_TEST_EXISTS));
+
+ g_assert (gnutls_pkcs11_init (GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL) == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+ g_assert (gnutls_pkcs11_add_provider (module_path, NULL) == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+ g_free (module_path);
+#endif
+
g_test_add ("/tls/" BACKEND "/certificate/create-pem", TestCertificate, NULL,
setup_certificate, test_create_pem, teardown_certificate);
g_test_add ("/tls/" BACKEND "/certificate/create-der", TestCertificate, NULL,
@@ -574,6 +611,8 @@ main (int argc,
setup_certificate, test_create_certificate_with_issuer, teardown_certificate);
g_test_add ("/tls/" BACKEND "/certificate/create-with-garbage-input", TestCertificate, NULL,
setup_certificate, test_create_certificate_with_garbage_input, teardown_certificate);
+ g_test_add ("/tls/" BACKEND "/certificate/pkcs11", TestCertificate, NULL,
+ setup_certificate, test_create_certificate_pkcs11, teardown_certificate);
g_test_add_func ("/tls/" BACKEND "/certificate/create-chain", test_create_certificate_chain);
g_test_add_func ("/tls/" BACKEND "/certificate/create-no-chain", test_create_certificate_no_chain);
diff --git a/tls/tests/connection.c b/tls/tests/connection.c
index 21a150a..ed62c49 100644
--- a/tls/tests/connection.c
+++ b/tls/tests/connection.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#ifdef BACKEND_IS_GNUTLS
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/pkcs11.h>
#else
#include "openssl-include.h"
#endif
@@ -1064,6 +1065,110 @@ test_client_auth_connection (TestConnection *test,
g_assert_true (g_tls_certificate_is_same (peer, cert));
}
+/* https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib-networking/issues/104 */
+#if 0
+static void
+test_client_auth_pkcs11_connection (TestConnection *test,
+ gconstpointer data)
+{
+#ifndef BACKEND_IS_GNUTLS
+ g_test_skip ("This backend does not support PKCS #11");
+#else
+ GIOStream *connection;
+ GError *error = NULL;
+ GTlsCertificate *cert;
+ GTlsCertificate *peer;
+ gboolean cas_changed;
+ GSocketClient *client;
+ GTlsInteraction *interaction;
+
+ test->database = g_tls_file_database_new (tls_test_file_path ("ca-roots.pem"), &error);
+ g_assert_no_error (error);
+ g_assert_nonnull (test->database);
+
+ interaction = mock_interaction_new_static_password ("ABC123");
+
+ connection = start_async_server_and_connect_to_it (test, G_TLS_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED);
+ test->client_connection = g_tls_client_connection_new (connection, test->identity, &error);
+ g_assert_no_error (error);
+ g_assert_nonnull (test->client_connection);
+ g_object_unref (connection);
+
+ g_tls_connection_set_interaction (G_TLS_CONNECTION (test->client_connection), interaction);
+ g_tls_connection_set_database (G_TLS_CONNECTION (test->client_connection), test->database);
+
+ cert = g_tls_certificate_new_from_pkcs11_uris
("pkcs11:model=mock;manufacturer=GLib-Networking;serial=1;token=Mock%20Certificate;id=%4D%6F%63%6B%20%43%65%72%74%69%66%69%63%61%74%65;object=Mock%20Certificate;type=cert",
+
"pkcs11:model=mock;manufacturer=GLib-Networking;serial=1;token=Mock%20Certificate;id=%4D%6F%63%6B%20%50%72%69%76%61%74%65%20%4B%65%79;object=Mock%20Private%20Key;type=private",
+ &error);
+ g_assert_no_error (error);
+
+ g_tls_connection_set_certificate (G_TLS_CONNECTION (test->client_connection), cert);
+
+ /* All validation in this test */
+ g_tls_client_connection_set_validation_flags (G_TLS_CLIENT_CONNECTION (test->client_connection),
+ G_TLS_CERTIFICATE_VALIDATE_ALL);
+
+ cas_changed = FALSE;
+ g_signal_connect (test->client_connection, "notify::accepted-cas",
+ G_CALLBACK (on_notify_accepted_cas), &cas_changed);
+
+ read_test_data_async (test);
+ g_main_loop_run (test->loop);
+ wait_until_server_finished (test);
+
+ g_assert_no_error (test->read_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (test->server_error);
+
+ peer = g_tls_connection_get_peer_certificate (G_TLS_CONNECTION (test->server_connection));
+ g_assert_nonnull (peer);
+ g_assert_true (g_tls_certificate_is_same (peer, cert));
+ g_assert_true (cas_changed);
+
+ g_object_unref (cert);
+ g_object_unref (test->client_connection);
+ g_clear_object (&test->server_connection);
+
+ /* Now start a new connection to the same server with a different client cert.
+ * Also test using a single URI matching both the cert and private key.
+ */
+ client = g_socket_client_new ();
+ connection = G_IO_STREAM (g_socket_client_connect (client, G_SOCKET_CONNECTABLE (test->address),
+ NULL, &error));
+ g_assert_no_error (error);
+ g_object_unref (client);
+ test->client_connection = g_tls_client_connection_new (connection, test->identity, &error);
+ g_assert_no_error (error);
+ g_assert_nonnull (test->client_connection);
+ g_object_unref (connection);
+
+ g_tls_connection_set_interaction (G_TLS_CONNECTION (test->client_connection), interaction);
+ g_tls_client_connection_set_validation_flags (G_TLS_CLIENT_CONNECTION (test->client_connection),
+ 0);
+ cert = g_tls_certificate_new_from_pkcs11_uris
("pkcs11:model=mock;manufacturer=GLib-Networking;serial=1;token=Mock%20Certificate;id=%4D%6F%63%6B%20%50%72%69%76%61%74%65%20%4B%65%79%20%32",
+ NULL,
+ &error);
+ g_assert_no_error (error);
+ g_tls_connection_set_certificate (G_TLS_CONNECTION (test->client_connection), cert);
+ g_object_unref (cert);
+ g_tls_connection_set_database (G_TLS_CONNECTION (test->client_connection), test->database);
+
+ read_test_data_async (test);
+ g_main_loop_run (test->loop);
+ wait_until_server_finished (test);
+
+ g_assert_no_error (test->read_error);
+ g_assert_no_error (test->server_error);
+
+ /* peer should see the second client cert */
+ peer = g_tls_connection_get_peer_certificate (G_TLS_CONNECTION (test->server_connection));
+ g_assert_nonnull (peer);
+ g_assert_true (g_tls_certificate_is_same (peer, cert));
+
+ g_object_unref (interaction);
+#endif
+}
+#endif
+
static void
test_client_auth_rehandshake (TestConnection *test,
gconstpointer data)
@@ -2445,6 +2550,10 @@ main (int argc,
char *argv[])
{
int ret;
+#ifdef BACKEND_IS_GNUTLS
+ char *module_path;
+ const char *spy_path;
+#endif
g_test_init (&argc, &argv, NULL);
g_test_bug_base ("http://bugzilla.gnome.org/";);
@@ -2454,6 +2563,34 @@ main (int argc,
g_assert_true (g_ascii_strcasecmp (G_OBJECT_TYPE_NAME (g_tls_backend_get_default ()), "GTlsBackend"
BACKEND) == 0);
+#ifdef BACKEND_IS_GNUTLS
+ module_path = g_test_build_filename (G_TEST_BUILT, "mock-pkcs11.so", NULL);
+ g_assert_true (g_file_test (module_path, G_FILE_TEST_EXISTS));
+
+ /* This just adds extra logging which is useful for debugging */
+ spy_path = g_getenv ("PKCS11SPY_PATH");
+ if (!spy_path)
+ {
+ spy_path = "/usr/lib64/pkcs11-spy.so"; /* Fedora's path */
+ if (!g_file_test (spy_path, G_FILE_TEST_EXISTS))
+ spy_path = "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/pkcs11-spy.so"; /* Debian/Ubuntu's path */
+ }
+
+ if (g_file_test (spy_path, G_FILE_TEST_EXISTS))
+ {
+ g_debug ("Using PKCS #11 Spy");
+ g_setenv ("PKCS11SPY", module_path, TRUE);
+ g_free (module_path);
+ module_path = g_strdup (spy_path);
+ }
+
+ ret = gnutls_pkcs11_init (GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL);
+ g_assert_cmpint (ret, ==, GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+ ret = gnutls_pkcs11_add_provider (module_path, NULL);
+ g_assert_cmpint (ret, ==, GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+ g_free (module_path);
+#endif
+
g_test_add ("/tls/" BACKEND "/connection/basic", TestConnection, NULL,
setup_connection, test_basic_connection, teardown_connection);
g_test_add ("/tls/" BACKEND "/connection/verified", TestConnection, NULL,
@@ -2484,6 +2621,11 @@ main (int argc,
setup_connection, test_client_auth_request_fail, teardown_connection);
g_test_add ("/tls/" BACKEND "/connection/client-auth-request-none", TestConnection, NULL,
setup_connection, test_client_auth_request_none, teardown_connection);
+ /* https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib-networking/issues/104 */
+#if 0
+ g_test_add ("/tls/" BACKEND "/connection/client-auth-pkcs11", TestConnection, NULL,
+ setup_connection, test_client_auth_pkcs11_connection, teardown_connection);
+#endif
g_test_add ("/tls/" BACKEND "/connection/no-database", TestConnection, NULL,
setup_connection, test_connection_no_database, teardown_connection);
g_test_add ("/tls/" BACKEND "/connection/failed", TestConnection, NULL,
diff --git a/tls/tests/meson.build b/tls/tests/meson.build
index 4a172b6..f1aec11 100644
--- a/tls/tests/meson.build
+++ b/tls/tests/meson.build
@@ -21,16 +21,32 @@ envs = [
'G_TEST_BUILDDIR=' + meson.current_build_dir(),
]
+if backends.contains('gnutls')
+ mock_pkcs11_module = shared_module('mock-pkcs11',
+ sources: 'mock-pkcs11.c',
+ name_prefix: '',
+ gnu_symbol_visibility: 'hidden',
+ dependencies: [
+ gio_dep,
+ gnutls_dep,
+ ],
+ install: enable_installed_tests,
+ install_dir: installed_tests_execdir
+ )
+else
+ mock_pkcs11_module = []
+endif
+
if enable_installed_tests
install_subdir('files', install_dir: installed_tests_execdir)
endif
test_programs = [
- ['certificate', [], deps],
- ['file-database', [], deps],
- ['connection', ['mock-interaction.c'], deps],
+ ['certificate', [], deps, [mock_pkcs11_module]],
+ ['file-database', [], deps, []],
+ ['connection', ['mock-interaction.c'], deps, [mock_pkcs11_module]],
# DTLS tests are disabled until we fix https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib-networking/issues/49
-# ['dtls-connection', ['mock-interaction.c'], deps],
+# ['dtls-connection', ['mock-interaction.c'], deps, [mock_pkcs11_module]],
]
foreach backend: backends
@@ -80,7 +96,7 @@ foreach backend: backends
'G_TEST_BUILDDIR=@0@'.format(meson.current_build_dir())
]
- test(program_name, exe, env: test_envs)
+ test(program_name, exe, env: test_envs, depends: program[3])
if backend == 'gnutls' and program[0] == 'connection' or program[0] == 'dtls-connection'
# Run the tests again, this time with TLS 1.3 disabled so we can test TLS 1.2.
diff --git a/tls/tests/mock-pkcs11.c b/tls/tests/mock-pkcs11.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1a5a53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tls/tests/mock-pkcs11.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3051 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 The Pkcs11Interop Project
+ * Copyright 2019 Igalia S.L.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Originally written for the Pkcs11Interop project by: Jaroslav IMRICH <jimrich jimrich sk>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This file implements a PKCS #11 module to be loaded that returns a mock slot and objects.
+ *
+ * It is based on this project originally: https://github.com/Pkcs11Interop/pkcs11-mock
+ *
+ * Quite a few things have been changed since then though:
+ * - The CK defines just below use glib macros just out of convenience.
+ * - Logging was added just for ease of debugging.
+ * - Instead of hardcoded defines for objects this now has an array
+ * of mock_objects that is easier to read and extend. The search behavior
+ * of C_FindObjects was also updated to actually search through this.
+ * - The certificates/keys are real certificates/keys backed by gnutls
+ * loading them in C_Initialize from glib-networkings normal test data.
+ * This changes the behavior of many functions most notably including C_GetAttributeValue
+ * and C_Sign to use them. Any function not used in a TLS handshake was largely
+ * ignored and won't work.
+ */
+
+#undef G_LOG_DOMAIN
+#define G_LOG_DOMAIN "MockPKCS11"
+
+#include <gio/gio.h>
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/x509.h>
+#include <gnutls/abstract.h>
+
+/* See http://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-base/v2.40/os/pkcs11-base-v2.40-os.html */
+#define CK_PTR *
+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType G_MODULE_EXPORT name
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType G_MODULE_EXPORT name
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
+#define NULL_PTR NULL
+
+#include "pkcs11/pkcs11.h"
+
+
+#define IGNORE(P) (void)(P)
+
+#define MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID "GLib-Networking"
+#define MOCK_MODEL "mock"
+#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN 256
+#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN 4
+
+static CK_INFO mock_info = {
+ .cryptokiVersion = { 2, 40 },
+ .manufacturerID = MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID,
+ .libraryDescription = "Mock Module",
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS object_class;
+ CK_TOKEN_INFO info;
+ union {
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
+ gnutls_privkey_t key;
+ };
+} MockObject;
+
+static MockObject mock_objects[] = {
+ {
+ .object_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE,
+ .info = {
+ .model = MOCK_MODEL,
+ .label = "Mock Certificate",
+ .serialNumber = "1",
+ .manufacturerID = MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID,
+ .flags = CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED | CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED | CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED |
CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED,
+ .ulMaxSessionCount = 1,
+ },
+ },
+ {
+ .object_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,
+ .info = {
+ .model = MOCK_MODEL,
+ .label = "Mock Private Key",
+ .serialNumber = "2",
+ .manufacturerID = MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID,
+ .flags = CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED | CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED | CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED |
CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED,
+ .ulMaxSessionCount = 1,
+ .ulMaxPinLen = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN,
+ .ulMinPinLen = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN,
+ },
+ },
+ {
+ .object_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,
+ .info = {
+ .model = MOCK_MODEL,
+ .label = "Mock Private Key 2",
+ .serialNumber = "3",
+ .manufacturerID = MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID,
+ .flags = CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED | CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED | CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED |
CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED,
+ .ulMaxSessionCount = 1,
+ .ulMaxPinLen = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN,
+ .ulMinPinLen = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN,
+ },
+ },
+ {
+ .object_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE,
+ .info = {
+ .model = MOCK_MODEL,
+ .label = "Mock Certificate 2",
+ .serialNumber = "4",
+ .manufacturerID = MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID,
+ .flags = CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED | CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED,
+ .ulMaxSessionCount = 1,
+ },
+ },
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ CK_SLOT_INFO info;
+ //CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR tokens[2];
+} MockSlot;
+
+static const MockSlot mock_slots[] = {
+ {
+ .info = {
+ .slotDescription = "Mock Slot",
+ .manufacturerID = MOCK_MANUFACTURER_ID,
+ .flags = CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT,
+ },
+ }
+};
+
+
+// FIXME: These are left overs that are unused
+#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA 1
+#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY 2
+#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY 3
+#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY 4
+#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID 0
+
+#define PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID 1
+
+typedef enum
+{
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_FIND,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_RECOVER,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT,
+ PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY
+} PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION;
+
+#define PKCS11_MOCK_CKO_ANYTHING -1 // We'll use -1 as a magic match all
+
+static CK_BBOOL pkcs11_mock_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pkcs11_mock_session_opened = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_ULONG pkcs11_mock_session_state = CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION;
+static PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+static CK_ULONG pkcs11_mock_sign_key = 0;
+static CK_LONG mock_search_template_class = PKCS11_MOCK_CKO_ANYTHING;
+static char *mock_search_template_label;
+static CK_ULONG mock_search_iterator = 0;
+static gboolean mock_logged_in_state = FALSE;
+static size_t mock_login_attempts = 0;
+static CK_ULONG mock_sign_algo = 0;
+
+static CK_FUNCTION_LIST pkcs11_mock_functions =
+{
+ {2, 20},
+ &C_Initialize,
+ &C_Finalize,
+ &C_GetInfo,
+ &C_GetFunctionList,
+ &C_GetSlotList,
+ &C_GetSlotInfo,
+ &C_GetTokenInfo,
+ &C_GetMechanismList,
+ &C_GetMechanismInfo,
+ &C_InitToken,
+ &C_InitPIN,
+ &C_SetPIN,
+ &C_OpenSession,
+ &C_CloseSession,
+ &C_CloseAllSessions,
+ &C_GetSessionInfo,
+ &C_GetOperationState,
+ &C_SetOperationState,
+ &C_Login,
+ &C_Logout,
+ &C_CreateObject,
+ &C_CopyObject,
+ &C_DestroyObject,
+ &C_GetObjectSize,
+ &C_GetAttributeValue,
+ &C_SetAttributeValue,
+ &C_FindObjectsInit,
+ &C_FindObjects,
+ &C_FindObjectsFinal,
+ &C_EncryptInit,
+ &C_Encrypt,
+ &C_EncryptUpdate,
+ &C_EncryptFinal,
+ &C_DecryptInit,
+ &C_Decrypt,
+ &C_DecryptUpdate,
+ &C_DecryptFinal,
+ &C_DigestInit,
+ &C_Digest,
+ &C_DigestUpdate,
+ &C_DigestKey,
+ &C_DigestFinal,
+ &C_SignInit,
+ &C_Sign,
+ &C_SignUpdate,
+ &C_SignFinal,
+ &C_SignRecoverInit,
+ &C_SignRecover,
+ &C_VerifyInit,
+ &C_Verify,
+ &C_VerifyUpdate,
+ &C_VerifyFinal,
+ &C_VerifyRecoverInit,
+ &C_VerifyRecover,
+ &C_DigestEncryptUpdate,
+ &C_DecryptDigestUpdate,
+ &C_SignEncryptUpdate,
+ &C_DecryptVerifyUpdate,
+ &C_GenerateKey,
+ &C_GenerateKeyPair,
+ &C_WrapKey,
+ &C_UnwrapKey,
+ &C_DeriveKey,
+ &C_SeedRandom,
+ &C_GenerateRandom,
+ &C_GetFunctionStatus,
+ &C_CancelFunction,
+ &C_WaitForSlotEvent
+};
+
+
+/* Copy a string into a buffer without NUL termination and padded with ' ' */
+static void
+copy_padded_string(CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR dest, const CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR src, size_t dest_size)
+{
+ const size_t len = strlen((char*)src);
+
+ g_assert (len < dest_size);
+
+ memset(dest, ' ', dest_size);
+ memcpy(dest, src, len);
+}
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs)
+{
+ int status;
+ gnutls_datum_t data;
+ char *path;
+
+ if (CK_TRUE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED;
+
+ IGNORE(pInitArgs);
+
+ // client.pem
+ path = g_test_build_filename(G_TEST_DIST, "files", "client.pem", NULL);
+ status = gnutls_load_file(path, &data);
+ g_debug("Loading %s - %s", path, gnutls_strerror(status));
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ status = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&mock_objects[0].cert);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ status = gnutls_x509_crt_import(mock_objects[0].cert, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ gnutls_free(data.data);
+ g_free(path);
+
+ // client-key.pem
+ path = g_test_build_filename(G_TEST_DIST, "files", "client-key.pem", NULL);
+ status = gnutls_load_file(path, &data);
+ g_debug("Loading %s - %s", path, gnutls_strerror(status));
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ status = gnutls_privkey_init(&mock_objects[1].key);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ status = gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw(mock_objects[1].key, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, NULL, 0);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ gnutls_free(data.data);
+ g_free(path);
+
+ // client2-key.pem
+ path = g_test_build_filename(G_TEST_DIST, "files", "client2-key.pem", NULL);
+ status = gnutls_load_file(path, &data);
+ g_debug("Loading %s - %s", path, gnutls_strerror(status));
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ status = gnutls_privkey_init(&mock_objects[2].key);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ status = gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw(mock_objects[2].key, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, NULL, 0);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ gnutls_free(data.data);
+ g_free(path);
+
+ // client2.pem
+ path = g_test_build_filename(G_TEST_DIST, "files", "client2.pem", NULL);
+ status = gnutls_load_file(path, &data);
+ g_debug("Loading %s - %s", path, gnutls_strerror(status));
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ status = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&mock_objects[3].cert);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ status = gnutls_x509_crt_import(mock_objects[3].cert, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ gnutls_free(data.data);
+ g_free(path);
+
+ pkcs11_mock_initialized = CK_TRUE;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Finalize)(CK_VOID_PTR pReserved)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ IGNORE(pReserved);
+
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(mock_objects[0].cert);
+ gnutls_privkey_deinit(mock_objects[1].key);
+
+ pkcs11_mock_initialized = CK_FALSE;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetInfo)(CK_INFO_PTR pInfo)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (NULL == pInfo)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ pInfo->cryptokiVersion = mock_info.cryptokiVersion;
+ copy_padded_string(pInfo->manufacturerID, mock_info.manufacturerID, sizeof(pInfo->manufacturerID));
+ pInfo->flags = 0;
+ copy_padded_string(pInfo->libraryDescription, mock_info.libraryDescription,
sizeof(pInfo->libraryDescription));
+ pInfo->libraryVersion = mock_info.libraryVersion;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetFunctionList)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList)
+{
+ if (NULL == ppFunctionList)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ *ppFunctionList = &pkcs11_mock_functions;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSlotList)(CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, CK_ULONG_PTR
pulCount)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ IGNORE(tokenPresent);
+
+ if (NULL == pulCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pSlotList)
+ {
+ *pulCount = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (0 == *pulCount)
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+
+ pSlotList[0] = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID;
+ *pulCount = 1;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSlotInfo)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo)
+{
+ MockSlot mock_slot;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (slotID > G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_slots))
+ return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pInfo)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ mock_slot = mock_slots[slotID];
+
+ copy_padded_string(pInfo->slotDescription, mock_slot.info.slotDescription,
sizeof(pInfo->slotDescription));
+ copy_padded_string(pInfo->manufacturerID, mock_slot.info.manufacturerID,
sizeof(pInfo->manufacturerID));
+ pInfo->flags = mock_slot.info.flags;
+ pInfo->hardwareVersion = mock_slot.info.hardwareVersion;
+ pInfo->firmwareVersion = mock_slot.info.firmwareVersion;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetTokenInfo)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo)
+{
+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (slotID > G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_slots))
+ return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pInfo)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ token = mock_objects[slotID].info;
+
+ copy_padded_string(pInfo->label, token.label, sizeof(pInfo->label));
+ copy_padded_string(pInfo->manufacturerID, token.manufacturerID, sizeof(pInfo->manufacturerID));
+ copy_padded_string(pInfo->serialNumber, token.serialNumber, sizeof(pInfo->serialNumber));
+ copy_padded_string(pInfo->model, token.model, sizeof(pInfo->model));
+ pInfo->flags = token.flags;
+ pInfo->ulMaxSessionCount = token.ulMaxSessionCount;
+ pInfo->ulSessionCount = (CK_TRUE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) ? 1 : 0;
+ pInfo->ulMaxRwSessionCount = token.ulMaxRwSessionCount;
+ pInfo->ulRwSessionCount = ((CK_TRUE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) && ((CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION !=
pkcs11_mock_session_state) || (CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS != pkcs11_mock_session_state))) ? 1 : 0;
+ pInfo->ulMaxPinLen = token.ulMaxPinLen;
+ pInfo->ulMinPinLen = token.ulMinPinLen;
+ pInfo->ulTotalPublicMemory = token.ulTotalPublicMemory;
+ pInfo->ulFreePublicMemory = token.ulFreePublicMemory;
+ pInfo->ulTotalPrivateMemory = token.ulTotalPrivateMemory;
+ pInfo->ulFreePrivateMemory = token.ulFreePrivateMemory;
+ pInfo->hardwareVersion = token.hardwareVersion;
+ pInfo->firmwareVersion = token.firmwareVersion;
+ memset(pInfo->utcTime, ' ', sizeof(pInfo->utcTime));
+
+ // FIXME: Not picked up by gnutls
+ if (mock_login_attempts > 2)
+ {
+ pInfo->flags |= CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetMechanismList)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (slotID > G_N_ELEMENTS(mock_slots))
+ return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pulCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanismList)
+ {
+ *pulCount = 9;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (9 > *pulCount)
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+
+ pMechanismList[0] = CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
+ pMechanismList[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+ pMechanismList[2] = CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS;
+ pMechanismList[3] = CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP;
+ pMechanismList[4] = CKM_DES3_CBC;
+ pMechanismList[5] = CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN;
+ pMechanismList[6] = CKM_SHA_1;
+ pMechanismList[7] = CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA;
+ pMechanismList[8] = CKM_AES_CBC;
+
+ *pulCount = 9;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetMechanismInfo)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID != slotID)
+ return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pInfo)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+ pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 1024;
+ pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 1024;
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+ pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 1024;
+ pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 1024;
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT | CKF_SIGN | CKF_SIGN_RECOVER | CKF_VERIFY
| CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER | CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS:
+ pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 1024;
+ pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 1024;
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
+ pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 1024;
+ pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 1024;
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_DES3_CBC:
+ pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 192;
+ pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 192;
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
+ pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 192;
+ pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 192;
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_GENERATE;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_SHA_1:
+ pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 0;
+ pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 0;
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_DIGEST;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA:
+ pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 128;
+ pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 256;
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_DERIVE;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_AES_CBC:
+ pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 128;
+ pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 256;
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT;
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
+ // FIXME: Made up key sizes
+ pInfo->ulMinKeySize = 256;
+ pInfo->ulMaxKeySize = 256;
+ // Flags based on table here:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-curr/v2.40/csd01/pkcs11-curr-v2.40-csd01.html
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_InitToken)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, CK_ULONG ulPinLen,
CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID != slotID)
+ return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pPin)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if ((ulPinLen < PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN) || (ulPinLen >
PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN))
+ return CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE;
+
+ if (NULL == pLabel)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (CK_TRUE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened)
+ return CKR_SESSION_EXISTS;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_InitPIN)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, CK_ULONG ulPinLen)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS != pkcs11_mock_session_state)
+ return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN;
+
+ if (NULL == pPin)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if ((ulPinLen < PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN) || (ulPinLen >
PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN))
+ return CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetPIN)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, CK_ULONG ulOldLen,
CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, CK_ULONG ulNewLen)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if ((CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION == pkcs11_mock_session_state) || (CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS ==
pkcs11_mock_session_state))
+ return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY;
+
+ if (NULL == pOldPin)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if ((ulOldLen < PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN) || (ulOldLen >
PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN))
+ return CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE;
+
+ if (NULL == pNewPin)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if ((ulNewLen < PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN) || (ulNewLen >
PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN))
+ return CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_OpenSession)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_FLAGS flags, CK_VOID_PTR pApplication,
CK_NOTIFY Notify, CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (CK_TRUE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened)
+ return CKR_SESSION_COUNT;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID != slotID)
+ return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID;
+
+ if (!(flags & CKF_SERIAL_SESSION))
+ return CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+ IGNORE(pApplication);
+
+ IGNORE(Notify);
+
+ if (NULL == phSession)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ pkcs11_mock_session_opened = CK_TRUE;
+ pkcs11_mock_session_state = (flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) ? CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION : CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION;
+ *phSession = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CloseSession)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ pkcs11_mock_session_opened = CK_FALSE;
+ pkcs11_mock_session_state = CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION;
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CloseAllSessions)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID != slotID)
+ return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID;
+
+ pkcs11_mock_session_opened = CK_FALSE;
+ pkcs11_mock_session_state = CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION;
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetSessionInfo)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pInfo)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ pInfo->slotID = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID;
+ pInfo->state = pkcs11_mock_session_state;
+ pInfo->flags = CKF_SERIAL_SESSION;
+ if ((pkcs11_mock_session_state != CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION) && (pkcs11_mock_session_state !=
CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS))
+ pInfo->flags = pInfo->flags | CKF_RW_SESSION;
+ pInfo->ulDeviceError = 0;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetOperationState)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pulOperationStateLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pOperationState)
+ {
+ *pulOperationStateLen = 256;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (256 > *pulOperationStateLen)
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+
+ memset(pOperationState, 1, 256);
+ *pulOperationStateLen = 256;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetOperationState)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState,
CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pOperationState)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (256 != ulOperationStateLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ IGNORE(hEncryptionKey);
+
+ IGNORE(hAuthenticationKey);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Login)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_USER_TYPE userType, CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,
CK_ULONG ulPinLen)
+{
+ // More hardcoding
+ const char *password = "ABC123";
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if ((CKU_SO != userType) && (CKU_USER != userType) && (CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC != userType))
+ return CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pPin)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if ((ulPinLen < PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MIN_PIN_LEN) || (ulPinLen >
PKCS11_MOCK_CK_TOKEN_INFO_MAX_PIN_LEN))
+ return CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE;
+
+ // FIXME: gnutls bug? It calls this before an operation
+ // if (pkcs11_mock_active_operation == PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE && CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC !=
userType)
+ // return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (mock_logged_in_state == TRUE)
+ return CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN;
+
+ if (ulPinLen == strlen (password) && strncmp ((char*)pPin, password, ulPinLen) == 0)
+ {
+ mock_logged_in_state = TRUE;
+ mock_login_attempts = 0;
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mock_login_attempts += 1;
+ return CKR_PIN_INCORRECT;
+ }
+
+ // TODO: We don't test any of these states atm
+ // switch (pkcs11_mock_session_state)
+ // {
+ // case CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION:
+
+ // if (CKU_SO == userType)
+ // rv = CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS;
+ // else
+ // pkcs11_mock_session_state = CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS;
+
+ // break;
+
+ // case CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS:
+ // case CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS:
+
+ // rv = (CKU_SO == userType) ? CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN :
CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN;
+
+ // break;
+
+ // case CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION:
+
+ // pkcs11_mock_session_state = (CKU_SO == userType) ? CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS :
CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS;
+
+ // break;
+
+ // case CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS:
+
+ // rv = (CKU_SO == userType) ? CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN :
CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN;
+
+ // break;
+ // }
+
+ // return rv;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Logout)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (mock_logged_in_state == FALSE)
+ return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN;
+
+ // if ((pkcs11_mock_session_state == CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION) || (pkcs11_mock_session_state ==
CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION))
+ // return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN;
+
+ mock_logged_in_state = FALSE;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CreateObject)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG
ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pTemplate)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == phObject)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++)
+ {
+ if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ *phObject = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CopyObject)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA != hObject)
+ return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == phNewObject)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if ((NULL != pTemplate) && (0 >= ulCount))
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++)
+ {
+ if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *phNewObject = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DestroyObject)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA != hObject) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hObject) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hObject) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hObject))
+ return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetObjectSize)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (hObject > G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_objects))
+ return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pulSize)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ *pulSize = 0; // FIXME: mock_objects[hObject].size;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetAttributeValue)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+ MockObject obj;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (hObject > G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_objects))
+ return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pTemplate)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ obj = mock_objects[hObject];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++)
+ {
+ if (CKA_LABEL == pTemplate[i].type || CKA_ID == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ if (NULL != pTemplate[i].pValue)
+ {
+ if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen < strlen((char*)obj.info.label))
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ else
+ memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, obj.info.label,
strlen((char*)obj.info.label));
+ }
+
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = strlen((char*)obj.info.label);
+ }
+ else if (CKA_EXTRACTABLE == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ *((CK_BBOOL *) pTemplate[i].pValue) = obj.object_class == CKO_CERTIFICATE ? CK_TRUE
: CK_FALSE;
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = sizeof(CK_BBOOL);
+ }
+ else if (CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE == pTemplate[i].type || CKA_SENSITIVE == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ *((CK_BBOOL *) pTemplate[i].pValue) = obj.object_class == CKO_PRIVATE_KEY ? CK_TRUE
: CK_FALSE;
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = sizeof(CK_BBOOL);
+ }
+ else if (CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ CK_ULONG t;
+ if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen < sizeof(CK_ULONG))
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+
+ if (obj.object_class == CKO_CERTIFICATE)
+ t = CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_AUTHORITY;
+ else
+ t = CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, &t, sizeof(CK_ULONG));
+ }
+ else if (CKA_SUBJECT == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ int status;
+ gnutls_datum_t data;
+ gnutls_x509_dn_t dn; /* Owned by cert */
+
+ g_assert (obj.object_class == CKO_CERTIFICATE);
+
+ status = gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject(obj.cert, &dn);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+ status = gnutls_x509_dn_get_str(dn, &data);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ if (data.size > pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ {
+ gnutls_free(data.data);
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = data.size;
+ if (pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) /* If NULL return OK */
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, data.data, data.size);
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = data.size;
+ gnutls_free(data.data);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (CKA_VALUE == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ if (obj.object_class == CKO_CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ int status;
+ gnutls_datum_t data;
+
+ status = gnutls_x509_crt_export2(obj.cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, &data);
+ g_assert(status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ if (data.size > pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ {
+ gnutls_free(data.data);
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = data.size;
+ if (pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) /* If NULL return OK */
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, data.data, data.size);
+ gnutls_free(data.data);
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = data.size;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (CKA_CLASS == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ if (NULL != pTemplate[i].pValue)
+ *((CK_ULONG *) pTemplate[i].pValue) = obj.object_class;
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = sizeof (obj.object_class);
+ }
+ else if (CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE ret = CKC_X_509;
+
+ if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE))
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ /* TODO: Test both TRUE and FALSE */
+ memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, &ret, sizeof(CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE));
+ }
+ else if (CKA_KEY_TYPE == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ CK_KEY_TYPE t;
+ if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE))
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (obj.object_class != CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ switch (gnutls_privkey_get_pk_algorithm (obj.key, NULL))
+ {
+ case GNUTLS_PK_RSA:
+ t = CKK_RSA;
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_PK_DSA:
+ t = CKK_DSA;
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_PK_DH:
+ t = CKK_DH;
+ break;
+ case GNUTLS_PK_EC:
+ t = CKK_EC;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION;
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, &t, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+ }
+ else if (CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ CK_BBOOL ret = CK_TRUE;
+
+ if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_BBOOL))
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ /* TODO: Test both TRUE and FALSE */
+ memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, &ret, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ }
+ else if (CKA_MODULUS == pTemplate[i].type && obj.object_class == CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)
+ {
+ /* Hardcode RSA for now */
+ gnutls_datum_t modulus;
+ int status = gnutls_privkey_export_rsa_raw (obj.key, &modulus, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ g_assert (status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+
+ if (modulus.size > pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ {
+ gnutls_free(modulus.data);
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = modulus.size;
+ if (pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) /* If NULL return OK */
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, modulus.data, modulus.size);
+ gnutls_free(modulus.data);
+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = modulus.size;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (CKA_SIGN == pTemplate[i].type && obj.object_class == CKO_PRIVATE_KEY) /* Any key
type in future */
+ {
+ CK_BBOOL ret = CK_TRUE;
+
+ if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_BBOOL))
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, &ret, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SetAttributeValue)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (hObject > G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_objects))
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_DATA != hObject) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hObject) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hObject) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hObject))
+ return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pTemplate)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++)
+ {
+ if ((CKA_LABEL == pTemplate[i].type) || (CKA_VALUE == pTemplate[i].type))
+ {
+ if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjectsInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
CK_ULONG ulCount)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+ CK_ULONG_PTR cka_class_value = NULL;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pTemplate && ulCount != 0)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ mock_search_template_class = PKCS11_MOCK_CKO_ANYTHING;
+ g_clear_pointer (&mock_search_template_label, g_free);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++)
+ {
+ if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ if (CKA_CLASS == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ if (sizeof(CK_ULONG) != pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ cka_class_value = (CK_ULONG_PTR) pTemplate[i].pValue;
+ mock_search_template_class = *cka_class_value;
+ }
+ else if (CKA_LABEL == pTemplate[i].type)
+ {
+ const char *cka_label_value = (char*)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+ mock_search_template_label = g_strndup (cka_label_value, pTemplate[i].ulValueLen);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ g_info ("Ignoring search template for %lu", pTemplate[i].type);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_FIND;
+ mock_search_iterator = 0;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjects)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, CK_ULONG
ulMaxObjectCount, CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_FIND != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if ((NULL == phObject) && (0 < ulMaxObjectCount))
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulObjectCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ *pulObjectCount = 0;
+ for (; mock_search_iterator < G_N_ELEMENTS (mock_objects) && *pulObjectCount < ulMaxObjectCount;
mock_search_iterator++)
+ {
+ if ((mock_search_template_class == PKCS11_MOCK_CKO_ANYTHING ||
mock_objects[mock_search_iterator].object_class == mock_search_template_class) &&
+ (mock_search_template_label == NULL || g_strcmp0
((char*)mock_objects[mock_search_iterator].info.label, mock_search_template_label) == 0))
+ {
+ phObject[*pulObjectCount] = mock_search_iterator;
+ *pulObjectCount = *pulObjectCount + 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_FindObjectsFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_FIND != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN != pkcs11_mock_active_operation))
+ return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism)
+ {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+
+ if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
+
+ if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) !=
pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_DES3_CBC:
+
+ if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (8 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_AES_CBC:
+
+ if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (16 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ {
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Encrypt)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pData)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulDataLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulEncryptedDataLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pEncryptedData)
+ {
+ if (ulDataLen > *pulEncryptedDataLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulDataLen; i++)
+ pEncryptedData[i] = pData[i] ^ 0xAB;
+
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulEncryptedDataLen = ulDataLen;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG
ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pPart)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulEncryptedPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pEncryptedPart)
+ {
+ if (ulPartLen > *pulEncryptedPartLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulPartLen; i++)
+ pEncryptedPart[i] = pPart[i] ^ 0xAB;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation))
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pulLastEncryptedPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pLastEncryptedPart)
+ {
+ switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ {
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation))
+ return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ switch (pMechanism->mechanism)
+ {
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+
+ if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
+
+ if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) !=
pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_DES3_CBC:
+
+ if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (8 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+
+ break;
+
+ case CKM_AES_CBC:
+
+ if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (16 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ {
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Decrypt)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG
ulEncryptedDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pEncryptedData)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulEncryptedDataLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulDataLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pData)
+ {
+ if (ulEncryptedDataLen > *pulDataLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulEncryptedDataLen; i++)
+ pData[i] = pEncryptedData[i] ^ 0xAB;
+
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG
ulEncryptedPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pEncryptedPart)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulEncryptedPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pPart)
+ {
+ if (ulEncryptedPartLen > *pulPartLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulEncryptedPartLen; i++)
+ pPart[i] = pEncryptedPart[i] ^ 0xAB;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR
pulLastPartLen)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation))
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pulLastPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pLastPart)
+ {
+ switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ {
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulLastPartLen = 0;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism)
+{
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation))
+ return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (CKM_SHA_1 != pMechanism->mechanism)
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+
+ if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ {
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Digest)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
+{
+ CK_BYTE hash[20] = { 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2C, 0x3A, 0x1F, 0x48, 0xC8, 0x60, 0x9A, 0xE2, 0x12, 0xCD, 0xFB,
0x63, 0x9D, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x5E };
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pData)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulDataLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulDigestLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pDigest)
+ {
+ if (sizeof(hash) > *pulDigestLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(pDigest, hash, sizeof(hash));
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulDigestLen = sizeof(hash);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pPart)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestKey)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, CK_ULONG_PTR
pulDigestLen)
+{
+ CK_BYTE hash[20] = { 0x7B, 0x50, 0x2C, 0x3A, 0x1F, 0x48, 0xC8, 0x60, 0x9A, 0xE2, 0x12, 0xCD, 0xFB,
0x63, 0x9D, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x5E };
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation))
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pulDigestLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pDigest)
+ {
+ if (sizeof(hash) > *pulDigestLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(pDigest, hash, sizeof(hash));
+
+ switch (pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ {
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT;
+ break;
+ case PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST:
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulDigestLen = sizeof(hash);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation))
+ return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (hKey > G_N_ELEMENTS(mock_objects) || mock_objects[hKey].object_class != CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ mock_sign_algo = pMechanism->mechanism;
+
+ // TODO: Hardcoded list
+ if (CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS == pMechanism->mechanism)
+ {
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params;
+
+ if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 == pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ params = pMechanism->pParameter;
+
+ g_assert (params->hashAlg == CKM_SHA256);
+ g_assert (params->mgf == CKG_MGF1_SHA256);
+ // if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hKey)
+ // return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ }
+ else if (CKM_RSA_PKCS == pMechanism->mechanism)
+ {
+ // FIXME: Also assert SHA256?
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ g_assert_not_reached ();
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE == pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN;
+ else
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT;
+
+ pkcs11_mock_sign_key = hKey;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Sign)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+ const gnutls_datum_t data = {
+ .data = pData,
+ .size = ulDataLen,
+ };
+ gnutls_datum_t signature;
+ int status;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pData)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulDataLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulSignatureLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ // TODO: Handle user not logged in
+
+ // TODO: Hardcoded algo list
+ if (mock_sign_algo == CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS)
+ status = gnutls_privkey_sign_hash2 (mock_objects[pkcs11_mock_sign_key].key,
GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256,
+ GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_SIGN_FLAG_RSA_PSS, &data, &signature);
+ else if (mock_sign_algo == CKM_RSA_PKCS)
+ status = gnutls_privkey_sign_hash2 (mock_objects[pkcs11_mock_sign_key].key,
GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA256,
+ GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_SIGN_FLAG_TLS1_RSA, &data, &signature);
+ else
+ g_assert_not_reached ();
+
+ // g_assert (status == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS);
+ if (status != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; // TODO: Best return code?
+
+ if (signature.size > *pulSignatureLen)
+ {
+ gnutls_free (signature.data);
+ *pulSignatureLen = signature.size;
+ if (pSignature != NULL)
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // This is called twice, once with NULL to just query size
+ if (pSignature != NULL)
+ {
+ memcpy (pSignature, signature.data, signature.size);
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ }
+ *pulSignatureLen = signature.size;
+ gnutls_free (signature.data);
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pPart)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR
pulSignatureLen)
+{
+ CK_BYTE signature[10] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09 };
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation))
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pulSignatureLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pSignature)
+ {
+ if (sizeof(signature) > *pulSignatureLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(pSignature, signature, sizeof(signature));
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN == pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ else
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_ENCRYPT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulSignatureLen = sizeof(signature);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignRecoverInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (CKM_RSA_PKCS == pMechanism->mechanism)
+ {
+ if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_RECOVER;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignRecover)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_RECOVER != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pData)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulDataLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulSignatureLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pSignature)
+ {
+ if (ulDataLen > *pulSignatureLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulDataLen; i++)
+ pSignature[i] = pData[i] ^ 0xAB;
+
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulSignatureLen = ulDataLen;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation))
+ return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if ((CKM_RSA_PKCS == pMechanism->mechanism) || (CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS == pMechanism->mechanism))
+ {
+ if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE == pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY;
+ else
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Verify)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
+{
+ CK_BYTE signature[10] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09 };
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pData)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulDataLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pSignature)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulSignatureLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (sizeof(signature) != ulSignatureLen)
+ return CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
+
+ if (0 != memcmp(pSignature, signature, sizeof(signature)))
+ return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pPart)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyFinal)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG
ulSignatureLen)
+{
+ CK_BYTE signature[10] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09 };
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation) &&
+ (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation))
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pSignature)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulSignatureLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (sizeof(signature) != ulSignatureLen)
+ return CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
+
+ if (0 != memcmp(pSignature, signature, sizeof(signature)))
+ return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY == pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ else
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyRecoverInit)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (CKM_RSA_PKCS == pMechanism->mechanism)
+ {
+ if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY_RECOVER;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_VerifyRecover)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG
ulSignatureLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_VERIFY_RECOVER != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pSignature)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulSignatureLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulDataLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pData)
+ {
+ if (ulSignatureLen > *pulDataLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulSignatureLen; i++)
+ pData[i] = pSignature[i] ^ 0xAB;
+
+ pkcs11_mock_active_operation = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_NONE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DigestEncryptUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG
ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DIGEST_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pPart)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulEncryptedPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pEncryptedPart)
+ {
+ if (ulPartLen > *pulEncryptedPartLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulPartLen; i++)
+ pEncryptedPart[i] = pPart[i] ^ 0xAB;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptDigestUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_DIGEST != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pEncryptedPart)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulEncryptedPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pPart)
+ {
+ if (ulEncryptedPartLen > *pulPartLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulEncryptedPartLen; i++)
+ pPart[i] = pEncryptedPart[i] ^ 0xAB;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SignEncryptUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG
ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_SIGN_ENCRYPT != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pPart)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulEncryptedPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pEncryptedPart)
+ {
+ if (ulPartLen > *pulEncryptedPartLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulPartLen; i++)
+ pEncryptedPart[i] = pPart[i] ^ 0xAB;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OPERATION_DECRYPT_VERIFY != pkcs11_mock_active_operation)
+ return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pEncryptedPart)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulEncryptedPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pulPartLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pPart)
+ {
+ if (ulEncryptedPartLen > *pulPartLen)
+ {
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulEncryptedPartLen; i++)
+ pPart[i] = pEncryptedPart[i] ^ 0xAB;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateKey)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN != pMechanism->mechanism)
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+
+ if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pTemplate)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == phKey)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++)
+ {
+ if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ *phKey = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateKeyPair)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR
pPrivateKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN != pMechanism->mechanism)
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+
+ if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pPublicKeyTemplate)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulPublicKeyAttributeCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pPrivateKeyTemplate)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == phPublicKey)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == phPrivateKey)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++)
+ {
+ if (NULL == pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ if (0 >= pPublicKeyTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++)
+ {
+ if (NULL == pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].pValue)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ if (0 >= pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ *phPublicKey = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ *phPrivateKey = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_WrapKey)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen)
+{
+ CK_BYTE wrappedKey[10] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09 };
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (CKM_RSA_PKCS != pMechanism->mechanism)
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+
+ if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PUBLIC_KEY != hWrappingKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL != pWrappedKey)
+ {
+ if (sizeof(wrappedKey) > *pulWrappedKeyLen)
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ else
+ memcpy(pWrappedKey, wrappedKey, sizeof(wrappedKey));
+ }
+
+ *pulWrappedKeyLen = sizeof(wrappedKey);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_UnwrapKey)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR
pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (CKM_RSA_PKCS != pMechanism->mechanism)
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+
+ if ((NULL != pMechanism->pParameter) || (0 != pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PRIVATE_KEY != hUnwrappingKey)
+ return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pWrappedKey)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulWrappedKeyLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pTemplate)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulAttributeCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == phKey)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ulAttributeCount; i++)
+ {
+ if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ *phKey = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_DeriveKey)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+ CK_ULONG i = 0;
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pMechanism)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA != pMechanism->mechanism)
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+
+ if ((NULL == pMechanism->pParameter) || (sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA) !=
pMechanism->ulParameterLen))
+ return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY != hBaseKey)
+ return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == phKey)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if ((NULL != pTemplate) && (0 >= ulAttributeCount))
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulAttributeCount; i++)
+ {
+ if (NULL == pTemplate[i].pValue)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+ if (0 >= pTemplate[i].ulValueLen)
+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *phKey = PKCS11_MOCK_CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_SECRET_KEY;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_SeedRandom)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, CK_ULONG ulSeedLen)
+{
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == pSeed)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulSeedLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GenerateRandom)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, CK_ULONG
ulRandomLen)
+{
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ if (NULL == RandomData)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (0 >= ulRandomLen)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ memset(RandomData, 1, ulRandomLen);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetFunctionStatus)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_CancelFunction)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_WaitForSlotEvent)(CK_FLAGS flags, CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, CK_VOID_PTR pReserved)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((0 != flags) && (CKF_DONT_BLOCK != flags))
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pSlot)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL != pReserved)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ return CKR_NO_EVENT;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_GetUnmanagedStructSizeList)(CK_ULONG_PTR pSizeList, CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount)
+{
+ CK_ULONG sizes[] = {
+ sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE),
+ sizeof(CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS),
+ sizeof(CK_FUNCTION_LIST),
+ sizeof(CK_INFO),
+ sizeof(CK_MECHANISM),
+ sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_INFO),
+ sizeof(CK_SESSION_INFO),
+ sizeof(CK_SLOT_INFO),
+ sizeof(CK_TOKEN_INFO),
+ sizeof(CK_VERSION),
+ sizeof(CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA),
+ sizeof(CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_PBE_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_RC2_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_RC5_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT),
+ sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA),
+ sizeof(CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT),
+ sizeof(CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA),
+ sizeof(CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS),
+ sizeof(CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS),
+ };
+
+ CK_ULONG sizes_count = sizeof(sizes) / sizeof(CK_ULONG);
+
+ if (NULL == pulCount)
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+ if (NULL == pSizeList)
+ {
+ *pulCount = sizes_count;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (sizes_count > *pulCount)
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+
+ memcpy(pSizeList, sizes, sizeof(sizes));
+ *pulCount = sizes_count;
+ }
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EjectToken)(CK_SLOT_ID slotID)
+{
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SLOT_ID != slotID)
+ return CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+
+CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_InteractiveLogin)(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
+
+
+ if (CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_initialized)
+ return CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+
+ if ((CK_FALSE == pkcs11_mock_session_opened) || (PKCS11_MOCK_CK_SESSION_ID != hSession))
+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+ switch (pkcs11_mock_session_state)
+ {
+ case CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION:
+
+ pkcs11_mock_session_state = CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS;
+
+ break;
+
+ case CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS:
+ case CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS:
+
+ rv = CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN;
+
+ break;
+
+ case CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION:
+
+ pkcs11_mock_session_state = CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS;
+
+ break;
+
+ case CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS:
+
+ rv = CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
diff --git a/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11.h b/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f796560
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11.h
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1994-1999 RSA Security Inc. Licence to copy this document
+ * is granted provided that it is identified as "RSA Security In.c Public-Key
+ * Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material mentioning or referencing
+ * this document.
+ *
+ * The latest version of this header can be found at:
+ * http://www.rsalabs.com/pkcs/pkcs-11/index.html
+ */
+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_
+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by
+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These
+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them
+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend
+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also
+ * on whether a PKCS #11 library is linked statically or
+ * dynamically).
+ *
+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention
+ * for PKCS #11 structures should be set. The PKCS #11
+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte
+ * aligned.
+ *
+ * In a Win32 environment, this might be done by using the
+ * following preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h
+ * or pkcs11t.h:
+ *
+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+ *
+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including
+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
+ *
+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own here. You might
+ * not need to do anything.
+ *
+ *
+ * Now for the macros:
+ *
+ *
+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an
+ * object. It can be used like this:
+ *
+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
+ *
+ * In a Win32 environment, it might be defined by
+ *
+ * #define CK_PTR *
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by
+ *
+ * #define CK_PTR *
+ *
+ *
+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
+ * an exportable PKCS #11 library function definition out of a
+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the
+ * following fashion to define the exposed PKCS #11 functions in
+ * a PKCS #11 library:
+ *
+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
+ * )
+ * {
+ * ...
+ * }
+ *
+ * For defining a function in a Win32 PKCS #11 .dll, it might be
+ * defined by
+ *
+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by
+ *
+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ * returnType name
+ *
+ *
+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
+ * an importable PKCS #11 library function declaration out of a
+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the
+ * following fashion:
+ *
+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
+ * );
+ *
+ * For declaring a function in a Win32 PKCS #11 .dll, it might
+ * be defined by
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ * returnType name
+ *
+ *
+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro
+ * which makes a PKCS #11 API function pointer declaration or
+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a
+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion:
+ *
+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a PKCS #11 API function
+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV.
+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args);
+ *
+ * or
+ *
+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a
+ * // PKCS #11 API function taking arguments args and returning
+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type
+ * // funcPtrType.
+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args);
+ * funcPtrType funcPtr;
+ *
+ * For accessing functions in a Win32 PKCS #11 .dll, in might be
+ * defined by
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+ * returnType (* name)
+ *
+ *
+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of
+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback.
+ * It should be used in the following fashion:
+ *
+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args);
+ *
+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback
+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also
+ * be used like this:
+ *
+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args);
+ * myCallbackType myCallback;
+ *
+ * In a Win32 environment, it might be defined by
+ *
+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ * returnType (* name)
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by
+ *
+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ * returnType (* name)
+ *
+ *
+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer.
+ *
+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well),
+ * this should be defined by
+ *
+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR
+ * #define NULL_PTR 0
+ * #endif
+ */
+
+/* All the various PKCS #11 types and #define'd values are in the
+ * file pkcs11t.h. */
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+
+#define __PASTE(x, y) x##y
+
+/* packing defines */
+#include "pkcs11p.h"
+/* ==============================================================
+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points.
+ * ==============================================================
+ */
+
+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
+ CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name)
+
+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the PKCS #11
+ * function prototypes. */
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+
+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+
+/* ==============================================================
+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for
+ * each PKCS #11 function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is
+ * a pointer to that kind of function.
+ * ==============================================================
+ */
+
+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_, name))
+
+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the PKCS #11
+ * function prototypes. */
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+
+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+
+/* ==============================================================
+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST
+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's PKCS #11 version
+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in
+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in
+ * pkcs11t.h.
+ * ==============================================================
+ */
+
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
+ __PASTE(CK_, name) \
+ name;
+
+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST {
+
+ CK_VERSION version; /* PKCS #11 version */
+
+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */
+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the PKCS #11
+ * function prototypes. */
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+};
+
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+
+#undef __PASTE
+
+/* unpack */
+#include "pkcs11u.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11f.h b/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11f.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb74230
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11f.h
@@ -0,0 +1,812 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1994-1999 RSA Security Inc. Licence to copy this document
+ * is granted provided that it is identified as "RSA Security In.c Public-Key
+ * Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material mentioning or referencing
+ * this document.
+ */
+/* This function contains pretty much everything about all the */
+/* PKCS #11 function prototypes. Because this information is */
+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */
+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */
+/* should not be altered. */
+
+/* General-purpose */
+
+/* C_Initialize initializes the PKCS #11 library. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets
+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR
+ * and dereferenced */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the
+ * PKCS #11 library. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about PKCS #11. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to
+ * function list */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Slot and token management */
+
+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */
+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in
+ * the system. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */
+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token
+ * in the system. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types
+ * supported by a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular
+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */
+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */
+(
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */
+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */
+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */
+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */
+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Session management */
+
+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a
+ * token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */
+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */
+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */
+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a
+ * token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation
+ * in a session. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
+ * operation in a session. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */
+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */
+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Object management */
+
+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */
+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the
+ * copy. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */
+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object
+ * attributes. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */
+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object
+ * attributes */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */
+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session
+ * objects that match a template. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */
+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session
+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object
+ * handles. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */
+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session
+ * objects. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Encryption and decryption */
+
+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */
+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */
+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */
+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Message digesting */
+
+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */
+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting
+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of
+ * the data already digested. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Signing and MACing */
+
+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption)
+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to
+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the
+ *signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single
+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the
+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */
+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
+ * returning the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where
+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the
+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */
+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */
+
+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the
+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot
+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext
+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */
+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */
+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification
+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification
+ * operation, checking the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */
+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification
+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part
+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */
+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
+
+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting
+ * and encryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
+ * digesting operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */
+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
+ * encryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */
+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
+ * verify operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */
+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Key management */
+
+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key
+ * object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */
+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
+ * creating new key objects. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen mech. */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template for pub. key */
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub. attrs. */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template for priv. key */
+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv. attrs. */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub. key handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets priv. key handle */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new
+ * key object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */
+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */
+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key
+ * object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */
+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Random number generation */
+
+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's
+ * random number generator. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */
+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */
+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Parallel function management */
+
+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an
+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an
+ * application. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function
+ * running in parallel. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */
+ );
+#endif
+
+/* Functions added in for PKCS #11 Version 2.01 or later */
+
+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion,
+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */
+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */
+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */
+ );
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11p.h b/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11p.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c92013
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11p.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1994-1999 RSA Security Inc. Licence to copy this document
+ * is granted provided that it is identified as "RSA Security Inc. Public-Key
+ * Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material mentioning or referencing
+ * this document.
+ */
+/* these data types are platform/implementation dependent. */
+/*
+ * Packing was removed from the shipped RSA header files, even
+ * though it's still needed. put in a central file to help merging..
+ */
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WINDOWS)
+#ifdef __clang__
+#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wpragma-pack"
+#endif
+#ifdef _MSC_VER
+#pragma warning(disable : 4103)
+#endif
+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+#endif
diff --git a/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11t.h b/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11t.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d17fa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11t.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1799 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
+
+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
+ * referencing the derived work.
+
+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
+ * warranty of any kind.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_
+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1
+
+#define CK_TRUE 1
+#define CK_FALSE 0
+
+#define CK_INVALID_SESSION 0
+
+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */
+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE;
+
+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */
+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR;
+
+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */
+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR;
+
+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */
+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL;
+
+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */
+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;
+
+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */
+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */
+typedef long int CK_LONG;
+
+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS;
+
+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */
+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL)
+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0
+
+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR;
+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR;
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR;
+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR;
+
+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */
+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR;
+
+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */
+/* handle or object handle */
+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0
+
+/* pack */
+#include "pkcs11p.h"
+
+typedef struct CK_VERSION {
+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */
+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */
+} CK_VERSION;
+
+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_INFO {
+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from
+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* PKCS #11 interface ver */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */
+
+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */
+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */
+} CK_INFO;
+
+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR;
+
+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that
+ * PKCS #11 provides to an application */
+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG
+ * for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION;
+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0
+
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID;
+
+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR;
+
+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */
+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO {
+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from
+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
+ CK_FLAGS flags;
+
+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */
+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */
+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */
+} CK_SLOT_INFO;
+
+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */
+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/
+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */
+
+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR;
+
+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */
+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO {
+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from
+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */
+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */
+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */
+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */
+
+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount,
+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been
+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */
+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */
+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */
+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */
+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */
+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */
+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */
+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */
+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */
+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */
+
+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for
+ * v2.0 */
+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */
+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */
+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */
+} CK_TOKEN_INFO;
+
+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows:
+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random # \
+ * generator */
+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is \
+ * write- \
+ * protected */
+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must \
+ * login */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's \
+ * PIN is set */
+
+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set,
+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic
+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys
+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */
+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020
+
+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means
+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that
+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */
+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040
+
+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is
+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login
+ * without sending a PIN through the PKCS #11 library itself */
+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100
+
+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true,
+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform
+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and
+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt
+ * and sign) */
+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200
+
+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an
+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11.
+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause
+ * the token to be reinitialized. */
+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400
+
+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is
+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for
+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and
+ onwards. */
+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once
+ * since the last successful authentication. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not
+ * possible. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token
+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
+ * expired by the card. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since
+ * the last successful authentication. */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO
+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible.
+ */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token
+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
+ * expired by the card. */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000
+
+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR;
+
+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a PKCS #11-assigned value that
+ * identifies a session */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE;
+
+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR;
+
+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of PKCS #11 users */
+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE;
+/* Security Officer */
+#define CKU_SO 0
+/* Normal user */
+#define CKU_USER 1
+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */
+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2
+
+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */
+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE;
+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0
+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1
+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2
+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3
+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4
+
+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */
+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO {
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID;
+ CK_STATE state;
+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */
+
+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */
+} CK_SESSION_INFO;
+
+/* The flags are defined in the following table:
+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */
+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */
+
+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR;
+
+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an
+ * object */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE;
+
+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR;
+
+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or
+ * types) of objects that PKCS #11 recognizes. It is defined
+ * as follows: */
+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS;
+
+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */
+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */
+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */
+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000
+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001
+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002
+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003
+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004
+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005
+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006
+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007
+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
+
+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a
+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object
+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE;
+
+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */
+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001
+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002
+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003
+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
+
+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */
+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE;
+
+/* the following key types are defined: */
+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000
+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001
+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002
+
+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */
+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */
+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003
+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003
+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004
+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005
+
+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010
+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011
+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012
+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013
+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014
+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015
+
+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016
+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017
+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */
+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018
+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018
+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019
+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A
+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B
+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C
+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D
+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E
+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F
+
+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020
+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021
+
+/* Camellia is proposed for v2.20 Amendment 3 */
+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025
+
+#define CKK_SEED 0x00000026
+
+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
+
+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate
+ * type */
+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG
+ * for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
+
+#define CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_UNSPECIFIED 0UL
+#define CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_TOKEN_USER 1UL
+#define CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_AUTHORITY 2UL
+#define CK_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY_OTHER_ENTITY 3UL
+
+/* The following certificate types are defined: */
+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */
+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000
+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001
+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002
+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
+
+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute
+ * type */
+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
+
+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which
+ consists of an array of values. */
+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000
+
+/* The following attribute types are defined: */
+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000
+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001
+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002
+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003
+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010
+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011
+
+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */
+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012
+
+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080
+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081
+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082
+
+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new
+ * for v2.10 */
+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083
+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084
+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085
+
+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */
+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086
+
+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ...
+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087
+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088
+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089
+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A
+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B
+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090
+
+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100
+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101
+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102
+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103
+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104
+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105
+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106
+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107
+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108
+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109
+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A
+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B
+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C
+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110
+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111
+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120
+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121
+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122
+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123
+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124
+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125
+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126
+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127
+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128
+/* CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO is new for v2.40 */
+#define CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO 0x00000129
+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130
+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131
+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132
+
+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133
+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134
+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS
+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */
+
+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160
+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161
+
+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS,
+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162
+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163
+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164
+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165
+
+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */
+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166
+
+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170
+
+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11,
+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */
+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180
+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180
+
+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181
+
+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS,
+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */
+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200
+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201
+
+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ...
+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202
+
+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210
+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x00000211)
+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x00000212)
+
+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET
+ * are new for v2.10 */
+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300
+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301
+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302
+
+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400
+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401
+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402
+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403
+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404
+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405
+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406
+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480
+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481
+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482
+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500
+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501
+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502
+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503
+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x00000600)
+
+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
+
+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length
+ * and value of an attribute */
+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE {
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type;
+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
+
+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */
+} CK_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR;
+
+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */
+typedef struct CK_DATE {
+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */
+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */
+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */
+} CK_DATE;
+
+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism
+ * type */
+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
+
+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001
+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002
+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003
+
+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS
+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */
+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004
+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006
+
+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009
+
+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31,
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A
+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E
+
+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010
+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011
+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021
+
+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE,
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for
+ * v2.11 */
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032
+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033
+
+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040
+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041
+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042
+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043
+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044
+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045
+
+/* CKM_SHA224 new for v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046
+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047
+
+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100
+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101
+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102
+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103
+
+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104
+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105
+
+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110
+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111
+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120
+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121
+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122
+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123
+
+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124
+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125
+
+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130
+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131
+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133
+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134
+
+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN,
+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC,
+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136
+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140
+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141
+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142
+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143
+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144
+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145
+
+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150
+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151
+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152
+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153
+
+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200
+
+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201
+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202
+
+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210
+
+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211
+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212
+
+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220
+
+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221
+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222
+
+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC,
+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC,
+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242
+
+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250
+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251
+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252
+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260
+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261
+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262
+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270
+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271
+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272
+
+/* CKM_SHA224 new for v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255
+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256
+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257
+
+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */
+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */
+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300
+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301
+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302
+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303
+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304
+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305
+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310
+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311
+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312
+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313
+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314
+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315
+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320
+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321
+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321
+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322
+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322
+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323
+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323
+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324
+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325
+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330
+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331
+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332
+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333
+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334
+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335
+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340
+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341
+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342
+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343
+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344
+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345
+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363
+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364
+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365
+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370
+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371
+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372
+
+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN,
+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and
+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373
+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374
+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375
+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376
+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377
+
+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378
+
+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380
+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381
+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390
+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391
+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392
+
+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393
+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394
+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395
+
+/* CKM_SHA224 new for v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396
+
+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB
+
+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */
+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0
+
+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0
+
+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0
+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1
+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2
+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3
+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4
+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5
+
+/* TLS 1.2 mechanisms are new for v2.40 */
+#define CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003E0
+#define CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003E1
+#define CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x000003E2
+#define CKM_TLS12_KEY_SAFE_DERIVE 0x000003E3
+#define CKM_TLS12_MAC 0x000003E4
+#define CKM_TLS_MAC 0x000003E4
+#define CKM_TLS_KDF 0x000003E5
+
+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400
+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401
+
+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500
+
+/* Fortezza mechanisms */
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a
+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010
+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011
+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020
+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030
+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031
+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032
+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033
+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034
+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035
+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036
+
+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11,
+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */
+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040
+
+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041
+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042
+
+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE
+ * are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050
+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051
+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052
+
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065
+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070
+
+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC,
+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN,
+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are
+ * new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080
+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081
+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082
+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083
+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084
+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085
+/* new for v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086
+/* new for v2.30 */
+#define CKM_AES_GCM 0x00001087
+#define CKM_AES_CCM 0x00001088
+#define CKM_AES_CTS 0x00001089
+#define CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC 0x0000108C
+#define CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96 0x0000108D
+
+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090
+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091
+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092
+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093
+
+/* Camellia is proposed for v2.20 Amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557
+
+#define CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN 0x00000650
+#define CKM_SEED_ECB 0x00000651
+#define CKM_SEED_CBC 0x00000652
+#define CKM_SEED_MAC 0x00000653
+#define CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000654
+#define CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD 0x00000655
+#define CKM_SEED_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000656
+#define CKM_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000657
+
+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100
+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101
+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103
+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104
+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105
+
+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002
+
+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
+
+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular
+ * mechanism */
+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter;
+
+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */
+} CK_MECHANISM;
+
+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR;
+
+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular
+ * mechanism */
+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO {
+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize;
+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize;
+ CK_FLAGS flags;
+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
+
+/* The flags are defined as follows:
+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */
+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */
+
+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN,
+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP,
+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not
+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */
+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100
+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200
+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400
+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800
+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000
+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000
+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000
+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000
+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000
+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000
+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000
+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000
+
+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE,
+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They
+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism
+ * information. */
+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000
+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000
+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000
+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000
+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000
+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000
+
+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */
+
+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR;
+
+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a
+ * PKCS #11 function */
+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV;
+
+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000
+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001
+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002
+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003
+
+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */
+
+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006
+
+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS,
+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */
+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007
+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008
+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009
+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A
+
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013
+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020
+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021
+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030
+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031
+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032
+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040
+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051
+
+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054
+
+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060
+
+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */
+
+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062
+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063
+
+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED,
+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED,
+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for
+ * v2.0 */
+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064
+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065
+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066
+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067
+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068
+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069
+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A
+
+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070
+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071
+
+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID
+ * were removed for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082
+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090
+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091
+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0
+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1
+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2
+
+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3
+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4
+
+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0
+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1
+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3
+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5
+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6
+
+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and
+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8
+
+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0
+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1
+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0
+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1
+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0
+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1
+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2
+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100
+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101
+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102
+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103
+
+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
+ * are new to v2.01 */
+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104
+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105
+
+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110
+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115
+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120
+
+/* These are new to v2.0 */
+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121
+
+/* These are new to v2.11 */
+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130
+
+/* These are new to v2.0 */
+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150
+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160
+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170
+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180
+
+/* These are new to v2.01 */
+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190
+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191
+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0
+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1
+
+/* This is new to v2.20 */
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200
+
+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
+
+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */
+ CK_NOTIFICATION event,
+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */
+ );
+
+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a PKCS #11 spec
+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the
+ * PKCS #11 functions */
+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
+
+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR;
+
+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR;
+
+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a
+ * mutex object */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)(
+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */
+ );
+
+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a
+ * mutex object */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)(
+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
+ );
+
+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)(
+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
+ );
+
+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a
+ * mutex */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)(
+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */
+ );
+
+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to
+ * C_Initialize */
+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS {
+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
+ CK_FLAGS flags;
+ /* The official PKCS #11 spec does not have a 'LibraryParameters' field, but
+ * a reserved field. NSS needs a way to pass instance-specific information
+ * to the library (like where to find its config files, etc). This
+ * information is usually provided by the installer and passed uninterpreted
+ * by NSS to the library, though NSS does know the specifics of the softoken
+ * version of this parameter. Most compliant PKCS#11 modules expect this
+ * parameter to be NULL, and will return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD from
+ * C_Initialize if Library parameters is supplied. */
+ CK_CHAR_PTR *LibraryParameters;
+ /* This field is only present if the LibraryParameters is not NULL. It must
+ * be NULL in all cases */
+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
+
+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001
+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002
+
+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR;
+
+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */
+
+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */
+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message
+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when
+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption
+ * scheme. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following MGFs are defined */
+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512
+ * are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004
+
+/* v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source
+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block
+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */
+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */
+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source;
+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData;
+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen;
+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */
+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
+ CK_ULONG sLen;
+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE;
+
+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */
+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001
+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002
+#define CKD_SHA224_KDF 0x00000005
+#define CKD_SHA256_KDF 0x00000006
+#define CKD_SHA384_KDF 0x00000007
+#define CKD_SHA512_KDF 0x00000008
+
+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms,
+ * where each party contributes one key pair.
+ */
+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */
+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE;
+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined
+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */
+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003
+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004
+
+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party
+ * contributes one key pair */
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation
+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */
+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_BBOOL isSender;
+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and
+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just
+ * holds the effective keysize */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC
+ * mechanism */
+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS {
+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */
+
+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */
+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */
+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */
+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR
+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and
+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */
+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS {
+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
+} CK_RC5_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC
+ * mechanism */
+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS {
+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */
+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */
+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */
+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */
+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */
+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR
+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block
+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of
+ * the MAC */
+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
+ CK_BYTE iv[8];
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
+ CK_ULONG length;
+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
+ CK_BYTE iv[16];
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
+ CK_ULONG length;
+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
+ CK_BYTE cb[16];
+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_GCM_PARAMS is new for version 2.30 */
+typedef struct CK_GCM_PARAMS {
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv;
+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD;
+ CK_ULONG ulAADLen;
+ CK_ULONG ulTagBits;
+} CK_GCM_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_GCM_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_GCM_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_CCM_PARAMS is new for version 2.30 */
+typedef struct CK_CCM_PARAMS {
+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNonce;
+ CK_ULONG ulNonceLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD;
+ CK_ULONG ulAADLen;
+ CK_ULONG ulMACLen;
+} CK_CCM_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_CCM_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CCM_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS {
+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword;
+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen;
+ CK_ULONG ulQLen;
+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ;
+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR
+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR;
+
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS {
+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX;
+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword;
+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData;
+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA;
+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword;
+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData;
+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA;
+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR
+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector;
+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;
+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;
+ CK_ULONG ulIteration;
+} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */
+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS {
+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */
+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */
+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR
+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA {
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;
+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA;
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR
+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT {
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer;
+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT;
+
+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; /* Unused. Must be set to CK_FALSE. */
+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS {
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput;
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* TLS 1.2 is new for version 2.40 */
+typedef struct CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism;
+} CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR
+ CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; /* Unused. Must be set to CK_FALSE. */
+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism;
+} CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfMechanism;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLength;
+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pContextData;
+ CK_ULONG ulContextDataLength;
+} CK_TLS_KDF_PARAMS;
+
+typedef struct CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfMechanism;
+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength;
+ CK_ULONG ulServerOrClient;
+} CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA {
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen;
+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion;
+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR
+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed;
+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel;
+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput;
+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT {
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV;
+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits;
+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits;
+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits;
+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber;
+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; /* Unused. Must be set to CK_FALSE. */
+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS {
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle;
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism;
+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism;
+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes;
+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen;
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes;
+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen;
+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA {
+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
+ CK_ULONG ulLen;
+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;
+
+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR
+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR;
+
+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the
+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit
+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the
+ * derived key */
+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to
+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate
+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.1. */
+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001
+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_GOSTR3411 0x00000002
+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA224 0x00000003
+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA256 0x00000004
+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA384 0x00000005
+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512 0x00000006
+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512_224 0x00000007
+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512_256 0x00000008
+
+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the
+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5
+ * PBKDF2. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001
+
+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the
+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */
+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS {
+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource;
+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData;
+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen;
+ CK_ULONG iterations;
+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf;
+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData;
+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen;
+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword;
+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen;
+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* NSS Specific defines */
+
+/* defines that have been deprecated in 2.20, but maintained in our
+ * header file for backward compatibility */
+#define CKO_KG_PARAMETERS CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS
+#define CKF_EC_FP CKF_EC_F_P
+/* new in v2.11 deprecated by 2.20 */
+#define CKR_KEY_PARAMS_INVALID 0x0000006B
+
+/* stuff that for historic reasons is in this header file but should have
+ * been in pkcs11n.h */
+#define CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE 0xffffffff
+
+/* undo packing */
+#include "pkcs11u.h"
+
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11u.h b/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11u.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2ffb2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tls/tests/pkcs11/pkcs11u.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1994-1999 RSA Security Inc. Licence to copy this document
+ * is granted provided that it is identified as "RSA Security Inc. Public-Key
+ * Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material mentioning or referencing
+ * this document.
+ */
+/*
+ * reset any packing set by pkcs11p.h
+ */
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WINDOWS)
+#ifdef __clang__
+#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wpragma-pack"
+#endif
+#ifdef _MSC_VER
+#pragma warning(disable : 4103)
+#endif
+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
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