[gtk+/gtk-3-14] Remove overzealous validity check for secrets

[Matthias Clasen <matthiasc src gnome org>]

commit 7d066258f39fb51f20e57a379b265708c2303d57
Author: Andre Heinecke <aheinecke intevation de>
Date:   Mon Nov 24 10:59:32 2014 +0100

    Remove overzealous validity check for secrets
    
       We directly get the length of the secret from the g_variant
       and use it in a following g_strndup which ensures that the
       resulting string is terminated.
    
       This fixes reading secrets which were stored by system-config-printer.
    
    https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=740612

 modules/printbackends/cups/gtkcupssecretsutils.c |    5 ++---
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/modules/printbackends/cups/gtkcupssecretsutils.c 
b/modules/printbackends/cups/gtkcupssecretsutils.c
index 895e4bb..7c5f374 100644
--- a/modules/printbackends/cups/gtkcupssecretsutils.c
+++ b/modules/printbackends/cups/gtkcupssecretsutils.c
@@ -200,10 +200,9 @@ get_secret_cb (GObject      *source_object,
 
       g_variant_unref (secret);
 
-      if (ba_passwd == NULL || strlen (ba_passwd) > len + 1)
+      if (ba_passwd == NULL)
         {
-          /* No secret or the secret is not a zero terminated value */
-          GTK_NOTE (PRINTING, g_print ("Invalid secret.\n"));
+          GTK_NOTE (PRINTING, g_print ("Invalid / no secret found.\n"));
           g_variant_unref (s_value);
           goto fail;
         }